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LEARNING SEQUENCES: THEIR EXISTENCE, EFFECT AND EVOLUTION
Abstract
Much is known about the importance of learning and some of the distinct learning processes that 
organizations use (e.g., trial-and-error learning, vicarious learning, experimental learning and 
improvisational learning).  Yet surprisingly little is known about whether these processes combine over 
time in ordered ways since most research on learning explores one particular process.  Using theory 
elaboration and theory building methods and data on the accumulated country entries of entrepreneurial 
firms, we address this gap. Our core contribution is an emergent theoretical framework that develops the 
concept of learning sequences. We find that learning sequences exist and are influenced by initial 
conditions.  We also find that learning sequences evolve in fundamentally distinct ways over time and 
with repeated use. Finally, data show how different learning sequences differentially effect performance, 
both in the shorter-term as well as in the longer-term, suggesting that it matters which learning processes 
are used and when. Overall, our findings on learning sequences have important implications for learning 
theory, international entrepreneurship, and the growing literature on process management.
1Organizational learning is of fundamental interest in organizational theory and strategy. Some 
studies show that firms learn to diversify into new countries (Barkema, Bell, & Pennings, 1996; Zahra, 
Ireland, & Hitt, 2000) or product markets (Miner, Bassoff, & Moorman, 2001) in order to capture scale 
and scope economies.  Other empirical work finds that firms learn to expand their operations through 
acquisitions (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 2002) or alliances (Anand & Khanna, 2000; Hoang 
& Rothaermel, 2005) in order to create corporate value.  Still other research reveals that firms learn to 
disseminate knowledge (Darr, Argote, & Epple, 1995), augment throughput (Lieberman, 1984) and 
reduce defects (Levin, 2000) in order to improve pricing and productivity.   Indeed, research suggests that 
organizational learning is a central means by which firms generate innovations, adapt to environments, 
take advantage of emergent market opportunities, and create competitive advantage (Argote, 1999).
However, despite the importance of organizational learning, empirical research generally explores 
one particular learning process (e.g., trial-and-error learning, vicarious learning, experimental learning 
and improvisational learning) while underexploring if different learning processes get used together in a 
sequence. For example, much work examines direct learning  i.e., learning from a firms own 
experience (Schwab, 2007). It frequently focuses on trial-and-error learning (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; 
Tsang, 2002; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). Studies in this stream suggest that learning occurs as 
organizations change their subsequent behavior in response to prior performance outcomes. To illustrate, 
in his study on the internationalization of Japanese electronics firms, Chang (1995) suggested that firms
learn how to enter new countries based on performance outcomes. Executives started with an initial 
investment in a foreign country such as the United States. If results from the initial investment proved 
positive, executives expanded investment in the same country; but if results were not positive, they did 
not.  Other work on direct learning examines experimental learning or improvisational learning.  Scholars 
argue that through experimental learning organizations gain knowledge and insight through deliberate 
small-scale tests generally conducted off-line that are explicitly designed to help managers better 
prepare for the future (Pisano, 1994; Thomke, 2003). By contrast, through improvisational learning
2organizations learn in real-time as design and action converge to solve emergent problems and take 
advantage of surprising opportunities (Miner et al., 2001). Finally, some scholars rivet attention on 
indirect learning  i.e., learning from others experience (Ingram, 2002).  Work in this stream generally 
focuses on vicarious learning.  Vicarious learning occurs as firms observe actions by other firms and then 
change their own behavior or beliefs as a result (Haunschild & Miner, 1997).  Through vicarious learning 
firms thus gain the benefits of accumulated knowledge while avoiding the expense of accumulated 
experience (Kim & Miner, 2007; Srinivasan, Haunschild, & Grewal, 2007).  Empirical studies show the 
relevance of vicarious learning in a variety of settings such as market entry (Greve, 1998), investment 
banker choices (Haunschild & Miner, 1997), hotel chain location decisions (Baum & Haveman, 1997), 
nursing home acquisitions (Baum, Li, & Usher, 2000) and product introductions (Srinivasan et al., 2007).  
But, while it is well known how each of these of learning processes is used alone, what is not 
known is if firms use them together over time in ordered ways. Some research attempts to explore 
interactions.  It explores direct learning and indirect learning (Schwab, 2007), shows that both occur 
concurrently in organizations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007), or considers interactions partially (Chuang & 
Baum, 2003; Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 1997). Missing from this body of research however is 
empirically grounded understanding about if there is a temporal order to the learning processes firms use 
and if this matters. We explore this gap. 
This article is organized around three research questions: (1) Do learning sequences exist? (2) Do 
learning sequences matter? and (3) Do learning sequences evolve over time? Consistent with other 
process-based organizational research (Abbott, 1990, 1995; Langley, 1999; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995),
we define a learning sequence as an ordered use of learning processes. Given the state of extant theory, 
we use theory-building (Eisenhardt, 1989) and theory-elaboration methods (Lee, 1999). The setting is the 
internationalization of nine entrepreneurial firms with headquarters in Singapore, the U.S. and Finland.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
3Research on learning from trial-and-error learning, experimental learning, improvisational learning, 
and vicarious learning is pertinent to our research question.  We focus on these specific direct and 
indirect learning processes since prior literature suggests their particular importance and prevalence 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978; Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Huber, 1991; Leavitt & March, 1988; Miner et al., 2001; 
Srinivasan et al., 2007). Consistent with previous research, we define learning as a regular shift in 
behavior or knowledge informed by prior action (Argote, 1999; Cyert & March, 1963; Levitt & March, 
1988; Miner et al., 2001). This definition incorporates both behavioral learning models, which stress 
change in action, and cognitive learning models, which stress change in ideas.  
A common direct learning process discussed in the literature is trial-and-error learning.  Trial-and-
error learning is defined as the process by which firm executives undertake a course of action and the 
consequences of that completed action lead to change in action or knowledge base (Argyris & Schon, 
1978; Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Greve, 2003).  An important characteristic therefore is that trial-and-error 
learning occurs after a firm experiences the consequences of an action and changes its behavior or draws 
inferences based on that completed action.  Managers repeat seemingly successful organizational actions, 
reflect on the outcomes, and then revise understandings and/or actions as needed (Haunschild & Sullivan, 
2002).  As one illustration, Van de Ven and Polley (1992) described trial-and-error learning in one firm
during the development of a biomedical innovation.  The authors found that when the prior actions of 
entrepreneurs were deemed successful, more resources were devoted to the innovation unit to pursue that 
same course of action. Also consistent with trial-and-error learning, the authors observed that when the 
actions of entrepreneurs were deemed unsuccessful, resource controllers intervened and new courses of 
actions were prescribed for the unit. 
Experimental learning is another direct learning process. Experimental learning is defined as
controlled situations that organizations use to test causal propositions and create new knowledge (Cook 
& Campbell, 1979). Because the central purpose of learning through experimentation is to acquire new 
knowledge of relationships, post hoc reflection on outcomes is high (Miner et al., 2001). Scholars argue 
4that organizations deliberately vary inputs off-line in comparative contexts (e.g., assessing the 
functionality of a product with different technical features integrated) and then closely monitor outcomes 
to correctly attribute outcomes to inputs (Thomke, 2003). Scholars further argue that this off-line 
nature of experimental learning sets it apart from other direct learning processes such as trial-and-error
(Miner et al., 2001). Thus, in experimental learning, variation in conditions is planned and intentionally 
introduced in order to produce insights about input/output relations.  The literature also suggests that 
experimental learning often relies on two key characteristics. First, it involves lower cost initiatives (e.g., 
use of economical, easy-to-modify prototypes or inexpensive focus groups to test different product sizes, 
colors, or packaging materials) that help yield more robust designs and solutions and direct attention to 
potential downstream risks (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Thomke, 2003).  Second, the new knowledge 
derived from experimental learning, if useful, can quickly be incorporated into firm activities (Pisano, 
1994). Hence, because experimental learning often involves lower cost initiatives, firms can use a variety 
of them to learn without the fear of crippling mistakes or financial over-commitment.  
A third direct learning process is improvisational learning.  Improvisational learning is defined as a
real-time learning process where firms learn to solve unexpected problems or capture surprising 
opportunities in the moment (Miner et al., 2001).  Real-time learning influences novel action at the same 
time that the action is taking place (Miner & Moorman, 1998; Weick, 1998). This emphasis on learning
in real-time as design and action converge sets improvisational learning apart from experimental learning
and trial-and-error learning. Hence, whereas the deliberate forming of contrasting situations during 
experimental learning results in the creation of new generalizable knowledge, the solving of a surprising 
problem during improvisation results in knowledge idiosyncratic to a particular time or place.  
Improvisational learning is also distinct from trial-and-error learning where prior experience plays a key 
role in changes to action or cognition.  With trial-and-error, learning occurs only after consequences of 
actions occur. Actions and their outcomes inform subsequent action or cognition (Miner et al., 2001). In 
contrast, with improvisational learning, managers do not wait for the consequences of actions. Changes in 
5action or cognition are made on the fly as planning and doing occur simultaneously.  Yet, as firms 
often retain and repeat successful activities discovered after an improvised outcome, improvisational 
learning may represent the first step in longer-term trial-and-error learning (Miner et al., 2001). 
While trial-and-error learning, experimental learning, and improvisational learning are common 
direct learning processes discussed in the literature, a common indirect learning process (i.e., learning 
from others experience rather than first hand) is vicarious learning (Huber, 1991; Kalnins, Swaminathan, 
& Mitchell, 2006; Levitt & March, 1988; Srinivasan et al., 2007).  It generally occurs as focal firms alter 
their behaviors or cognition in response to the actions of competitor firms (Kim & Miner, 2007). Through 
observations, decision makers gather information about the characteristics and outcomes of competitors.  
The frequent result is firms imitating seemingly successful practices (Denrell, 2003).   Some research 
suggests that vicarious learning may be an important initial learning process.  Faced with insufficient 
information to learn from their own experience, organizations can rely on others experiences to cover 
their deficit in understanding (Baum et al., 2000; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Kraatz, 1998).  Research shows 
that vicarious learning is particularly valuable in new industries and situations where uncertainty is high.  
For example, to explore how vicarious learning takes place as firms introduce new products in nascent 
markets, Srinivasan et al., (2007) examined product introductions of 67 firms in the U.S. digital camera 
market.  The authors found that changes in a focal firms rate of new product introductions was 
influenced by changes in new product introductions of other similarly sized and successful firms.   Yet 
other research suggests that vicarious learning may not be a good initial learning process.  These studies 
argue that new and/or inexperienced firms lack absorptive capacity to learn from others such that even if 
they are able to gain knowledge from others they may not be able to internalize it and leverage it fully 
(Henisz & Delios, 2001; Zahra & George, 2002).
In summary, the extant research on organizational leaning generally focuses on the relevance of
discrete direct learning processes (e.g., trial-and-error learning, experimental learning, or improvisational 
learning), and indirect learning processes (e.g., vicarious learning).  Consistent with other organizational 
6process research, this literature generally considers how learning with a discrete process occurs over 
time1.  But, while research on organizational learning provides much understanding about how firms use 
each of these discrete learning processes alone, it has provided little understanding about whether firms 
use multiple learning processes together in ordered ways over time.
 Some empirical studies attempt to address this gap by exploring if direct and indirect learning get 
used together (Baum & Ingram, 1998; Henisz & Delios, 2001; Schwab, 2007).  As one illustration, Baum 
et al., (2001) examined acquisitions made by chain nursing homes in Ontario, Canada from 1971-1996 
and found that a focal chain is both more likely to acquire a target the more similar the target is to all the 
focal chain's current components and the nearer the target is to other similar chains' current components.  
Likewise, Schwab (2007) indicated that relying on both direct and indirect learning leads to a 
substitutional interaction in which knowledge that is consistent from both sources exhibits a weaker 
effect than the linear addition of their independent effects.  Yet, although these studies are important in 
that they suggest that firms appear to learn both directly and indirectly, and that both may influence one 
another, future research opportunities remain since it is unclear whether direct or indirect learning occurs 
before the other and whether this matters. Moreover, prior empirical research on learning suggests that
direct learning may be unpacked into a set of distinct learning processes (i.e., experimental learning, trial-
and-error learning and improvisational learning) and that each may distinctly influence how learning 
takes place over time (Miner et al., 2001). As a push in this direction, Miner and colleagues (2001) 
explored improvisational learning and how this learning process contrasts with experimental learning and 
trial-and-error learning.  But, because the focus of this study was improvisational learning the authors did 
not directly explore how the use of improvisational learning might be used in connection with 
experimental learning, or trial-and-error learning except to conjecture that improvisational learning may 
drive out experimental learning or serve as episodes in longer-term trial-and-error learning. Moreover, 
  
1 Process research generally focuses on understanding the temporal dynamics of organizational phenomena such as learning 
(Van de Ven, 1992; Langley, 2007). For example, as noted earlier, research on trial-and-error learning describes how firms 
engage in an action and then the consequences of that action influence subsequent action (Van de Ven & Polley, 1992).
7the authors did not discuss whether vicarious learning temporally links with experimental learning, trial-
and-error learning and/or improvisational learning.  Overall, much is known about how firms use specific
learning processes.  However, little is known about whether firms use multiple learning processes in 
temporally ordered ways. In other words, understanding about learning sequences remains extremely 
limited. This gap is critical. From a practical perspective, if a particular order of learning processes leads 
to better performance outcomes than another order there are immediate applications for managers.  From 
a theoretical perspective, not understanding about learning sequences in process research on learning is 
problematic since the concept of sequences is central in much organizational process research (Adair & 
Brett, 2005; Amis, Slack, & Hinings, 2004; Burgelman, 1994, 1996; Langley, 1989) and one that is 
explicitly highlighted when scholars build theory from process data (Langley, 1999, 2007; Rindova, 
Ferrier, & Wiltbank, 2010; Van De Ven, 1992).
Our core contribution is helping establish sequences as a meaningful concept and focus in process 
research on learning. First, we uncover the existence of distinct learning sequences. Second, we reveal
how learning sequences evolve in distinct ways with repeated use. Finally, we show how different 
learning sequences differentially effect performance, both in the shorter-term as well as in the longer-
term, thereby implying that it matters which learning processes organizations use and when.  Beyond 
contributing to the field of organizational learning, these findings have implications for international 
entrepreneurship and the growing literature on process management.
METHODS
The research setting is nine entrepreneurial corporations in the global information technology (IT)
industry. The IT industry is attractive for this study because its high rate of change suggests the need for
learning.  We chose entrepreneurial firms because their small size simplifies the observation of learning 
processes in contrast with the complexity of larger firms. In addition, studying entrepreneurial firms 
minimizes left censoring of data because the firms can be tracked from inception.
8We focus on how entrepreneurial firms learn during internationalization (i.e., new country entry 
(Root, 1994)). Internationalization is a useful context in which to explore learning. First, country entries 
are discrete and easily detected events that can be analyzed in isolation or as part of a larger set of 
experiences. Second, during internationalization, firms may enter into countries that may or may not be 
similar to previously entered countries. This suggests variance in the effects of prior experience and the 
degree to which other firms may or may not be relied on for learning in a focal firm. Third, data for each 
country entry can be isolated, enabling both single and multi-country analysis.
We study nine firms with headquarters in each of three culturally distinct regions (i.e., Finland, 
U.S., and Singapore) (Hofstede, 1980).   Multiple regions enhance the relevance and generalizeability of 
the results 2. All sample firms were eight years old or younger at the time of data collection, and had 
entered all their country entries within the four years prior to data collection. This enhances accurate 
recall of events.  Moreover, each sample firm had entered into at least four countries (see Table 1 for 
information on sample). This ensures sufficient experience from which to examine if and how learning 
processes get used together over time.
We rely on four data sources: (1) quantitative and qualitative data from semi-structured interviews 
with company leaders; (2) e-mails, observations, and phone calls to follow-up on interviews and to track 
internationalization over time; (3) quantitative data on companies internationalization performance, by 
country, from company and public sources; and (4) archival data including company websites, business 
publications, and other materials produced inside the firm.  
The primary data source was the semi-structured interviews. There are two types of interviews 
corresponding to the two types of informants: HQ (e.g., CEO, founder, COO, and others responsible for 
  
2 We focus on these regions for several reasons. First, Singapore, U.S., and Finland are culturally distinct (Hofestede, 2001) 
thereby allowing us to have more generalizeable findings that apply beyond a particular set of firms  such as those coming from 
a large market like the United States.  Second, Singapore, the U.S. and Finland have clusters of technology-based firms thereby 
allowing us to find and compare patterns from similar technology based firms across regions. Thus, we have Singaporean, 
Finnish, and U.S.-based entrepreneurial firms focused on software (Table 1). Third, the choice of Singapore, U.S., and Finnish 
entrepreneurial firms is important from a methodological point of view as English is spoken fluently in each country by managers. 
This improves candor, depth of comments, and mitigates loss of data that may occur through translation and back translation of 
interview data.
9firm-wide activities) and country-level (e.g., Country Manager, country team members involved with 
entry into a particular country). This yielded over 50 interviews on three different continents with both 
the multi-country view from the corporate perspective as well as specific detail from individual countries
(see Table 2 for more information about informants). 
Each interview consisted of three main parts: (1) background information on the firm, (2) event 
chronology for a specific country entry (country-level interview), or for several entries (HQ-level 
interview), and (3) direct questions related to learning processes. For the event chronology, we asked 
open-ended questions that focused on the stream of country-entry events (e.g., How did your company 
gain its first sale? How did you move to your second sale?), and avoided broad speculation that was not 
grounded in specific events. We then reviewed the chronology, and asked if we had covered all key 
events. 
We concluded the interview with direct questions related to learning such as What, if any, were the 
lessons gained during this country entry? and What, if any, lessons from other country entries were 
used in this country entry? The technique of asking different questions (i.e., non-directive and directive) 
provides a stronger grounding of theoretical insights, mitigates bias (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1994), and is 
consistent with theory elaboration (Lee, 1999) and theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989).  We also sent 
follow-up emails, added extra interviews as needed, and triangulated interview data with observations 
and archival data to improve accuracy and completeness (Jick, 1979).
Informant bias is an important consideration. We addressed this issue in several ways. First, we 
combined both real time and retrospective data. Such a combination is valuable since the retrospective 
data enables efficient data collection of more observations (thus enabling better grounding) while real 
time data collection allows further depth in understanding about the order of events (Leonard-Barton 
1990). Second, previous research suggests that our interview techniques (e.g., courtroom questioning, 
event tracking, non-directive questioning, establishing a back in time cognitive frame) typically yield 
accurate and convergent information among informants and with archival data (Brown & Eisenhardt, 
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1997). The few differences that may arise are due primarily to informants relating different parts of the 
story, not because they are in conflict. Third, reliance on informants at multiple levels of hierarchy helps 
yield a more complete and thus, accurate picture of events due to complementary perspectives and 
granularity. Combining qualitative stories with quantitative measures has similar effects. We also relied
on informants who are particularly knowledgeable about the relevant events surrounding 
internationalization and for whom internationalization was quite important, thus improving memory 
accuracy. Fourth, the use of anonymity for both companies and informants encourages candor3. Finally, 
we supplemented interview data with archival information from the time period in question.
We began data analysis by writing individual case histories (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Eisenhardt, 1989). These were created by synthesizing the interview and archival data of each of the focal 
firms into a case history that described the chronological story of internationalization and how each firm 
learned in each country entered. After writing the individual case histories, we used them for two types of 
analysis: within-case and cross-case. Within-case analysis concentrated on emergent themes, and 
theoretical relationships linking experience and learning based on the insights from each firm. 
Since one of our research questions is if learning sequences influence performance, an important 
element of within-case analysis was determining each firms performance in each country entered.  We 
focus on country-level performance rather than overall corporate performance since the learning 
sequences described in this study are specifically related to learning during internationalization.  
Consistent with prior studies on internationalization, we assessed country performance in multiple ways
(Brush & Vanderwerf, 1992; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Dunning, 1980; Geringer & Herbert, 1990).   
First, we assessed country performance as the time until first sale in the new country, calculated in 
months. Second, we assessed country performance as the time to break even in the new country entered, 
calculated in months. We chose time until first sale and time to break even because these metrics provide 
  
3 Firms are disguised with pseudonyms drawn from early national presidents of the home country (i.e., Jackson, Polk, Tyler and 
Adams (U.S.), Kallio, Stahlberg and Ryti (Finland), Wee and Nair (Singapore)). See Table 1 for information on our sample 
firms.
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reliable, objective measures of performance available across the sample.  Third, we assessed country 
performance through survey using a Likert scale.  At the end of interviews, we asked informants involved 
with each entry to rate the success of the firm in the new the country after the first year on a 10-point 
Likert scale (0=very unsuccessful, 5=moderately successful, 10=extremely successful), and then 
computed the mean response. Our Likert measures are likely to be accurate as they span functional and 
hierarchical levels, thereby providing assessment of country performance from several vantage points. 
Overall, because we used a small sample to ensure depth of understanding about learning sequences our 
quantitative analysis on performance is limited.  However, because we use multiple, independent 
measures of country performance our study helps provide a more reliable assessment of performance than 
is possible from one performance measure alone (Zahra & Dess, 2001).  
As an important additional step, we also assessed both shorter and longer-term performance 
consequences resulting from following each learning sequence. We did this since prior theoretical 
research on learning suggests that learning may have both immediate and distant consequences 
(Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991; Sapienza, Autio, George, & Zahra, 2006). To assess shorter-
term performance consequences of learning sequences we averaged the scores for the first and second 
country entries for each of the three performance metrics4.  Likewise, to assess longer-term performance 
consequences we averaged the scores for the third and fourth country entries for each of the three 
performance metrics5.
After within-case analysis, we then began cross-case analysis.  This involved looking for the 
emergence of similar themes and relationships related to learning across multiple cases (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Miles & Huberman, 1994).  The cross-case analysis proceeded with a variety of lenses including 
grouping sample firms according to HQ nations, executive experience, and entry patterns. From the 
emerging patterns, we formed tentative theoretical constructs and propositions. We then refined them 
  
4 For example, if the time until first sale in the first country entered was 10 months and the time until first sale in the second 
country entered was 8 months, the shorter-term time until first sale would be 9 months.
5 For example, if the time until first sale in the third country entered was 20 months and the time until first sale in the fourth 
country entered was 18 months, the longer-term time until first sale would be 19 months.
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through replication logic, frequently revisiting the data to systematically compare and verify the 
occurrence of specific learning sequences within each case. We were aware of the existing literature on 
common learning processes (i.e., trial-and-error learning, vicarious learning, improvisational learning, 
and experimental learning) and so examined the data for the emergence of these construct categories and 
their temporally ordered use within each country entry. But, we also looked for unexpected learning 
processes. Thus, we combined theory elaboration (Lee, 1999) and theory generation (Eisenhardt, 1989) in 
our analysis. We then iterated between theory and data to clarify our findings and theoretical arguments. 
We also relied on literature in learning, process management, and international entrepreneurship to 
sharpen the conceptual underpinnings of our findings and visually depict them. For example, since 
sequences are a key focus in process research (Abbott, 1990; Van de Ven, 1992; Langley, 2007) and our 
study examines learning processes, we decided to follow the schematic approach used in other process 
research to depict our learning sequences.  Similar to how Langley (1989) used initial letters of people 
(i.e., M=manager; L=line person; and S=staff person) and arrows among them (e.g., LMS) to depict 
interaction sequences, we use initial letters of learning processes (i.e., T=trial-and-error learning; 
V=vicarious learning; E=experimental learning; I=improvisational learning) and arrows connecting them 
(e.g., VTE) to depict learning sequences. The overall analysis involved iterations between data, 
theory, and later extant research until a strong match between data and the theoretical framework 
occurred.   
LEARNING SEQUENCES
Do learning sequences exist and do they matter? 
The organizational learning literature generally focuses on particular learning processes such as 
trial-and-error learning or vicarious learning.  Although this literature indicates that there could be 
potential way in which these different learning processes might work together (Miner et al., 2001), the 
literature does not suggest that learning sequences exist.  The data in our study, however, reveal the 
existence of learning sequences. We find that organizations temporally order the use of multiple learning 
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processes over time. Moreover, our data reveal the existence of several distinct learning sequences 
seeding and soloing.  We define seeding sequences as learning sequences where firms start with indirect 
learning before direct learning.  We define soloing sequences as learning sequences where firms start 
with direct learning and then continue with direct learning.  Seeding and soloing emerged from the data 
and reflect the two ways that firms in our study began to learn. That is, firms may begin learning 
indirectly from others experience and so seed their subsequent direct learning. Alternatively, firms 
may begin learning directly through first-hand experience (and so be soloing since they do not rely on 
others to learn).
We coded sequences as seeding if in each new country entered the firm first began using an 
indirect learning process (e.g., vicarious learning) before transitioning to a direct learning process (e.g., 
trial-and-error learning). Likewise, we coded sequences as soloing if in each new country entered, the 
firm began using a direct learning process (e.g., experimental learning) and then switched to another 
direct learning process (trial-and-error learning or improvisational learning). Thus, a key distinguishing 
feature of soloing learning sequences is the absence indirect learning.  All nine of our sample firms 
developed seeding or soloing learning sequences in each of their country entries (See Table 3 for 
summary of sequence patterns and Appendices 1 and 2 for more detail on the learning sequences in each 
firm over time).  
We find evidence for two variations in seeding sequences.  The first variation is vicarious learning 
followed by trial-and-error learning.  Consistent with prior work, we assessed vicarious learning as a 
change in cognition and/or behavior resulting from observing others (Kim & Miner, 2007) and trial-and-
error learning as a change in cognition and/or behavior resulting from a completed action (Baum & 
Dahlin, 2007; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992). Yet, unlike prior work on vicarious learning, which tends to 
report on one specific form of vicarious learning, our analysis uncovered at least three forms.   
Specifically, we show that vicarious learning may take the form of (1) a modeling effect, where a firm 
imitates a competitors behavior, (2) an inhibitory effect, where a firm ceases behavior after observing 
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another firm experience a negative outcome for pursuing that behavior, or (3) an eliciting effect, where a 
firm engages in a behavior similar to a competitor firm but in a different way.
Sometimes vicarious learning takes the form of a modeling effect. This was the case with Ryti. 
Three young inexperienced entrepreneurs (about 25 years old) who had recently graduated from Helsinki 
University of Technology founded Ryti with the intention of creating a software solution to expedite drug 
discovery within the pharmaceutical industry. The founders developed technology that allowed patients, 
research professionals, and data managers to quickly capture and report clinical data through PDAs, cell 
phones, and computers during phase-three clinical trials.  Shortly after founding, the founders observed 
from Finnish competitor firms that accumulating trial experience seemed key to gaining access to global 
customers and that experience appeared easy to get in nearby Sweden. Given their lack of international 
experience to guide their actions, founders copied the seemingly successful practice of competitors and 
entered Sweden. Trial-and-error learning then followed this vicarious learning. During project 
implementation with a Swedish firm, leaders in the Swedish firm became frustrated with Rytis poor 
communication with them. This outcome prompted Ryti executives to improve their firms intranet and 
create a more effective dedicated email list. As support, one co-founder remarked, Our customer got 
frustrated since we were not actively sharing information on a daily basis. We learned to set up different 
mechanisms and improve the company intranet and the email list to tackle that specific problem.6
More intriguingly, data show that beyond a modeling effect, vicarious learning may also take other 
novel forms, such as an eliciting effect. Wee illustrates. The two founders of Singapore-based Wee had 
the goal of helping customers manage information security risks. When entering their first country entry, 
Hong Kong, the founders decided to target banks as their primary customer. This choice was influenced 
  
6 Firms typically referred to learning as learning by the executive team (Daily et al. 2000). Although these collective 
understandings in our study share features with team learning (Edmondson et al., 2001), we argue that it is more appropriately 
labeled organizational learning since these executive teams constitute an entrepreneurial organizations membership, 
leadership, and understanding.  This is also consistent with prior literature which argues that organizational learning in 
entrepreneurial firms is often equivalent to individual learning given that the firm consists of a relatively small number of 
people with little structure (Kim, 1993; Zahra et al., 2000; Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011)  i.e., entrepreneurial firms are often 
equivalent to executive teams.
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by vicarious learning.  The Country Manager of Singapore recalled, For the majority of the banks (in 
Singapore) their physical security, alarm and monitoring devices, is all taken care by Commercial 
Industry Security Corporation (CISCO).   It has a monitoring service.  Whenever there is a key or 
intrusion that takes place, the physical security monitoring devices send traffic back to the command 
center but in a physical way. What we decided to do is exactly the same thing in the cyber world.  
Subsequent to vicarious learning, Wee executives relied on trial-and-error learning.  After entering 
their first country (Hong Kong) executives used a sales approach of targeting IT groups in banks. Yet 
leaders discovered that because new technology guidelines required senior executives to understand the 
risks associated with their technology, many Hong Kong banks had shifted responsibility for information 
security away from IT and into audit. Based on this outcome, Wee executives began targeting audit 
groups instead of IT groups. The CEO said, There are a lot of organizations, including banks, which 
have transitioned from info-security under IT to info-security under the audit groupSo we changed.  
Our study also indicates another variation in seeding sequences. While the first variation is 
vicarious learning followed by trial-and-error learning, the second variation is advice from external firms
such as consultants, venture capitalists, and partners followed by trial-and-error learning7. Jackson
illustrates the use of this second variation in seeding sequences (see Appendix 1 for detail on seeding 
sequences across our sample firms). At the outset of their entry into their first country, China, executives 
at Jackson hired a consultant to help understand how to enter the market. Regarding the China entry, one 
executive noted that the consultant spear-headed the whole thing. From the consultant, Jackson
executives learned that in China there is a long due diligence process and that they needed to work with 
multiple distributors since the market is so big and diverse across regions. Based on this information 
Jackson executives entered the country and began working with multiple distributors as instructed by the 
  
7While both variations of seeding involve firms starting with an indirect learning process a key difference between the two is 
that vicarious learning does not involve deliberate contact with other firms (i.e., distant observation) whereas learning from the 
advice of external firms does involve contact with those firms.
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consultant. As one VP stated, [consultant] has been working with us to help us know how to develop 
relationships with distributors in China.  
After beginning with advice from an external consultant, Jackson executives turned to trial-and-
error learning.  For example, after entering China and trying to promote the firms wireless chips, 
executives discovered that Chinese firms didnt want to buy chips alone. Instead, they wanted turn-key 
solutions. A senior leader stated We found that companies in China require a very complete, end-to-end 
solution. Based on this new information, Jackson executives changed their behavior and started
providing turn-key solutions to better set itself the firm apart from the competition. The senior leader 
continued,  Texas Instruments, Intel  the big guys  they dont really provide that complete, end-to-end 
solution the way a start-up like we can, so it allows us to differentiate.
While our data show evidence of seeding learning sequences (where firms start with an indirect 
learning process before switching to a direct learning process) they also show evidence of soloing 
learning sequences (where firms start with a direct learning process and then switch to another direct 
learning process). As Table 3 indicates, there were several variations in soloing sequences (see also 
Appendix 2 for more detail on these learning sequences). Some firms began with improvisational 
learning before moving to trial-and-error learning.  More commonly, however, firms began with 
experimental learning before moving to trial-and-error learning. Intriguingly, however, while prior 
literature suggests that experimental learning generally occurs through deliberate small scale tests 
conducted off-line in controlled settings to help managers gain understanding (Miner et al., 2001; 
Pisano, 1994; Thomke, 2003), our data suggests that such experimental learning frequently occurs on-
line as managers try to learn while taking advantage of transient and unpredictable windows of 
opportunity8.  
  
8 Our study suggests that experimental learning may take a more nuanced form than what is described in the literature. We find 
that experimental learning often occurs on-line in the form of executives deliberately trying different sales approaches in 
comparative contexts to see which is more effective, seeing which market responds first to inquiries, or trying a new ownership 
structure to see if it is more effective than what exists.
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Adams provides an illustration of this soloing sequence variation. Adams is a U.S. based firm 
whose technology allows companies to integrate real-time information and personalized analytics into 
their corporate information portals, enterprise applications, and critical business processes.  Leaders 
started with experimental learning when entering their first country - Australia. Australia was viewed as a 
culturally similar market to the U.S. where leaders could learn to do international business.  One 
executive stated, Australia is a good test bedIts low risk and easy to see what drives profitability.
As part of the experiment, corporate leaders gave a highly experienced country manager a lot of 
autonomy to run the Australian business. However, corporate leaders discovered that this autonomy
resulted in an Australian venture that became too disconnected from corporate policies. This 
experimental outcome helped corporate leaders see the need to ensure more control and oversight of 
foreign teams and ventures.  After starting with some experimental learning, Adams executives then
learned through trial-and-error. Corporate leaders began pushing the local country manager to use a 
features and functions selling approach - an approach where Ill tell you the features and functions.  
You figure it out whether it suits your need or not. However, the country manager experienced very 
little success using the features and function approach. Because of this negative outcome, the country 
manager and corporate leaders decided to adopt a new selling approach that emphasized
solutions/consultative services. The country manager explained, The corporation was fairly infantile at 
the time we signed on in Australia, so it did not necessarily have lots of relevant selling experience that 
was useful. There was a much greater tool or product selling mentality. We were better able to get into 
the market with a solution selling methodology.
Overall, we find evidence for learning sequences. In general, this finding is important because prior 
process research on learning does not explore the concept of sequences directly and so does not specify if 
some learning processes might be used earlier vs. later.  A key question though is why firms use seeding 
and soloing sequences. The prior international experience of executives appears to be relevant here (see 
Table 3). Conceptual research suggests that when entrepreneurial firms enter new countries for the first 
18
time, they often lack the organizational structure needed for collective responses (Sapienza et al., 2006). 
It also argues that in these situations, prehistory resources, such as the prior experience of executives 
likely plays a salient role (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Our empirical study shows that the prior 
international experience of top management team members9 appears to shape whether firms begin by 
either learning directly (through first-hand experience) or indirectly (through others experience) and so 
whether firms use seeding or soloing sequences.
Some firms use seeding sequences. They start with an indirect learning process before transitioning 
to a direct learning process.  They do so because executives in these firms are often inexperienced in the 
context where knowledge is needed.  Thus, data show that in firms where the top management team had 
little (if any) international experience, vicarious learning or learning from the advice of external parties 
was used before trial-and-error learning in initial country entries (see Table 3). In contrast, other firms 
use soloing sequences. They do not rely on indirect learning. Rather, they focus exclusively on a 
sequence of different direct learning processes (e.g., experimental learning or improvisational learning 
preceding trial-and-error learning).  Firms appear to use soloing learning sequences because executives 
are often more experienced in the context where knowledge is needed. Therefore, where the top 
management team had more prior international experience, firms did not use indirect learning in initial 
learning sequences (see Table 3). Several top management team members at Adams, as one illustration,
had extensive international experience and relied more on this experience for guidance rather than on 
guidance from external sources.  For example, the VP of International stated, Most of my jobs for the 
last 15-20 years have had an international context in the sense I have managed businesses outside my 
home country. Likewise, the CEO, a person with over 20 years of international experience was 
described as Mr. International. He has lived and worked in South Africa, the U.K., Europe, and the 
United States. His experience has been exclusively global from the get go.
  
9 Consistent with prior literature, we define TMT members as those directly in charge of a firms strategic decisions and overall 
competitive positioning (Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000). Also consistent with prior literature, we assessed international 
experience by the number of years organizational members had lived and worked outside their home country (Carpenter & 
Fredrickson, 2001; Carpenter et al., 2001).
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We also find that initial learning sequences matter. Firms that use seeding sequences (i.e., start with 
indirect learning before direct learning) do not appear to perform as well in the shorter-term as firms that 
use soloing sequences. Specifically, firms that used seeding sequences in their first two country entries
took more time to capture their first sale, more time to break even, and had lower overall ratings of 
success than firms which used soloing sequences (e.g., experimental or improvisational learning before 
trial-and-error learning) (see Table 4).  With little international experience, leaders in these firms 
generally have less understanding for how to coordinate internal activities such as sales and product 
adaptations in new foreign markets (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 
2001; Daily, Certo, & Dalton, 2000).  As a result, these leaders appear to first use indirect learning; they 
look to other firms around them for clues about how to perform initial country entry activities. Yet, while 
such indirect learning is efficient, our data suggest that it may be less helpful for early performance as it 
is often non-strategic surface level knowledge that is not tailored to a firms specific needs and situation. 
For example, prior to entering their second country (U.S.), inexperienced leaders at the Finnish firm Ryti
learned indirectly from the advice of a Finnish government agency named Finpro about practical details 
regarding local contacts and then also some market information.  However, a VP noted the restricted 
value of this indirect learning when he stated that, Finpro was not very helpful.  I think we could have 
got that information from various other sources.  That wasnt particularly valuable information.
Moreover, the lack of direct experience on the part of executives using vicarious learning often leads 
them to not fully grasp true causal links between others actions and outcomes (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). 
Vicarious learning may therefore lead to partially incorrect knowledge.  Another co-founder of Ryti
recalled how this was case when entering the U.S.
Eighty percent of the top 25 pharma companies are headquartered in the United States and all of 
the competition was in the United States so we decided to rent an apartment in Cambridge (MA). I 
bought the flight ticket for the guy and handed him a telephone book listing the pharma companies 
and sent him offWe just thought that we would be able to come and close the deals and build the 
market position afterwards. But we realized that you really need to build the market position and 
then you start closing the deals. So we were coming at it from the wrong end in the beginning based 
on what we saw others do. I worked for one year for McKinsey and then for a year doing academic 
research at HUT, I worked a couple of months for some pharma companies, but I didnt have for 
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myself any relevant business experience. I think that this is the biggest flaw that we used to have.  
We are very young, very energetic, which is good, butamong the founding team, there is a lot of 
inexperience.
By contrast, firms that used soloing sequences seem to perform better in the shorter-term (Table 5). 
In their first two country entries, they took less time to capture their first sale, less time to break even, and 
had higher overall ratings of success than the firms using a seeding sequence. These firms appeared to 
perform better because of the previous international experience of their executive teams. The previous 
international experience of executives in new entrepreneurial firms seems to positively influence the 
outcomes of early internationalization for several reasons.  First, it can decrease the time needed to 
identify opportunities as well as the time needed to capture opportunities given existing networks and 
access to resources.  The founder of Polk provided support for these points when he said of his first 
country entry into China, Because I worked there I know that there is a gap.  As a businessman, you 
want to be the bridge and take a profit when you connect two places togetherThe first sale in China 
was quite easy. I have friends there. The prior international experience of executives also lowers the 
risk and so the cost of experimentation to uncover high performing organizational solutions (Sapienza et 
al., 2006). For example, when discussing how his firm decided to go into Australia (first country) shortly 
after founding, the CEO noted the use of experimental learning based on the prior experience of a top 
management team member. Said he, We started thinking about entering Australia based on [executive]. 
We knew he knew he had set up solutions in Australia beforeThe major experiment was letting 
[executive] approach this thing on a much more solutions oriented basis.  To his credit, [executive] not 
only did it, but proved that it was indeed the appropriate way to market the product. It also ended up 
helping the U.S. as well. The VP of International concurred when he remarked, [Executive] 
approached us and said he wanted to go back to Australiawith us he was essentially re-writing a 
business very similar to the one he started beforeIt was so clear that he knew what to do...it clicked 
from the beginning. In summary, our data suggest that particular learning sequences exist, that they are 
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influenced by prior executive experience, and that they appear to be consequential to early performance. 
Collectively, these observations lead to the following propositions:
Proposition 1: Firms use seeding or soloing learning sequences
Proposition 2: More executive experience at the time of first entry is more likely to lead to the use 
of a soloing sequence 
Proposition 3: Less executive experience at the time of first entry is more likely to lead to the use of 
a seeding sequence
Proposition 4: Use of a soloing sequence leads to higher performance in the shorter-term than use 
of a seeding sequence
Do learning sequences evolve over time and does this matter?
Our first section helps address two of our research questions (i.e., do learning sequences exist and 
do they matter) by describing the existence of learning sequences and how they matter for shorter-term
performance.  This section now addresses the remaining research question  that is, do learning 
sequences evolve over time?  Further, we describe how the evolution of learning sequences matters for 
longer-term performance.  
Two patterns related to evolution emerged from the data.  The first is sequence expansion. Firms 
that used seeding sequences in their first country entry experience expanded the number of learning 
processes used in subsequent country entries. By contrast, firms that used soloing sequences in their first 
country entry contracted the number of learning processes used in subsequent country entries. We 
assessed expansion and contraction of learning sequences by tracking the addition and deletion of 
learning processes over time in each new country entry. Figure 1 and Table 3 summarize this finding
while Appendices 1 and 2 provide more detail for it.
As Table 3 shows, there were variations in the expansion of seeding sequences. An interesting 
variation was firms iterating between indirect and direct learning. During this iteration sometimes firms 
would rely on different indirect learning processes (e.g., vicarious learning or learning from the advice of 
external firms), whereas sometimes they would rely on the same process. For example, when Wee leaders 
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entered their fourth country (China) they used vicarious learning at the onset of the entry (i.e., entry of a 
competitor firm into the large market of China helped persuade Wee leaders to enter). After entering and 
learning through direct trial-and-error Wee leaders then again relied on vicarious learning (i.e., they saw 
other foreign firms exiting China during SARS when sales plummeted and so decided to do the same). 
A more common variation however was firms expanding the number of direct learning processes 
subsequent to indirect learning. Moreover, we found that firms appeared to be using a novel direct
learning process that differed from other direct learning processes discussed in the literature (i.e., trial-
and-error learning, experimental learning, improvisational learning). We call this new process deviance-
error learning.  Deviance-error learning emerged from the data and is defined as breaking away from a 
previously successful action pattern, the consequences of which cause a drop in performance and a return 
to the previously used action.  Thus, with deviance-error learning, firm members learn the true 
importance of a prior action pattern when they move away from it and see performance dip.  Deviance-
error learning is therefore different from extant notions of trial-and-error learning where firms only 
change current action patterns when performance falls below aspirations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007; Greve, 
2003)10.
Jackson illustrates. When leaders entered their second country, Taiwan, they first relied on indirect
learning in the form of advice from a hired an external consultant. This consultant provided insight about 
competitive positioning in Taiwan. Regarding the consultant, one VP remarked, We were looking at cell 
phones, automotive navigation systems, and PDAs. Of those three product segments, we asked 
[consultant] about the competitor companies - What do they make? How well do those products fit in to 
what we have to offer? What is the value proposition that we can offer x company, y company, z 
company?  His (consultants) role has really been teaching us how to think about approaching 
companies.  Deviance-error learning then followed learning from advice.  Leaders moved away from 
using indirect sales through distributors (a successful action pattern established in their first country 
  
10 Please see Table 6 for greater details on distinctions among learning processes.
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China) to focus on direct sales. However, lack of market responsiveness in Taiwan helped Jackson
leaders realize the need to re-focus on indirect sales in Taiwan and subsequent countries in order to 
improve speed to market and bridge lack of local understanding. Leaders therefore returned to work with 
distributors as they had in their first country entry.  Trial-and-error learning came after deviance-error 
learning and learning from advice.  In discussions with Taiwanese firms, Jackson leaders found out that 
the CEO of Taiwanese firms often was not the final decision maker. Rather it was someone at a lower 
level. Consequently, Jackson executives changed their sales approach to appeal to lower levels too.  
Finally, after learning from advice, deviance-error learning, and trial-and-error learning, Jackson relied 
on improvisational learning.  During product delivery to a Taiwanese customer Jackson engineers had to 
reconfigure their product solution on the fly when the customer told them they only wanted development 
boards with documentation and support instead of the full solution Jackson engineers prepared. Through 
the improvisational episode, leaders realized that this stripped-down, no-frills solution could be 
offered as a new offering to more technological savvy customers in later countries.
Contrary to the expansion of seeding sequences, where firm leaders began increasing the number of 
learning processes used over time, we also find support for the contraction of soloing sequences, where 
firm leaders begin decreasing the number of learning processes used over time (see Figure 1 and Table 
3). For example, while executives at Stahlberg relied on both trial-and-error learning and improvisational 
learning in their first two country entries, they relied only on trial-and-error learning in their next two.  
To illustrate, shortly after the Finnish firm entered the United States (third entry), corporate executives 
moved marketing and sales functions to the U.S. since the U.S. market was perceived to be the most
important. However, executives soon found that moving too many functions to the U.S. too soon made 
Stahlberg overly U.S. centric.  As a result, corporate executives decided to move marketing and sales 
back to Finland where they could have greater control. Likewise, when the firm entered Japan (fourth 
entry), corporate executives wanted the local country manager to use a commission-based profit and loss 
system. Yet, corporate executives found that the commission-based system did not work well and so
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switched to transfer based pricing. The country manager of Japan explained the trial-and-error learning, 
Corporate wanted to do a commission-based establishmentSo we did a commission agreement until 
they (corporate) saw it would be better to do transfer price based accounting.
Why do some learning sequences contract over time while others expand?  Firms that use soloing 
sequences eliminate some learning processes over time since they performed well in the shorter-term and 
so executives become over-confident.  Executives seem to assume they already know how to do business 
in different countries and therefore only need to draw on their own experiential wisdom. An Stahlberg
leader conveyed the essence of this point when he said, I have a long experience of many sectors, and 
therefore I have a wide understanding of many different problems I pretty much know the culture in 
these countries which I cover.  Similarly, another Stahlberg leader remarked, I knew pretty much 
everything before, so I havent learned much new things. Executives as Polk reflected similar 
sentiments. A European director asserted, I obviously understand what it takes to set up an office and 
create demand and also all the legal implications of doing everything here.
By contrast, seeding sequences expand. Firm executives increase the number of learning processes 
over time since they performed less well in the shorter-term and so do not become over-confident. 
Because of their firms lower performance in initial country entries, and their own relative lack of 
international experience, executives in these firms may feel that more learning processes are needed to 
better understand how to act in subsequent country entries. One of the founders of Wee hinted at this
when describing how his firm began to rely on more learning processes in their third country entry. Said 
he, We knew that our big limitation was that we only had the technical know-how and domain 
knowledge.  What we didnt have was the domestic country knowledge.  That is what a local partner 
could give us. Likewise, a VP at Jackson VP noted how his firm started using more learning processes 
in their latter country entries, It is now a mix of what we are learning on the field, what our marketing 
guy in Asia is telling us, plus looking at reviews, looking at electronic press releases, looking at articles 
written about companies. We use lots of sources of information.  If I were to break it down, I say the VC 
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[venture capital] ones are generally the highest quality sources of information but we learned they 
cannot always hit all the main points.  There are a lot of gaps. 
A related question is if the expansion of seeding sequences and the contraction of soloing sequences 
matters. We find that the former seems to lead to higher performance and the latter seems to lead to lower 
performance.   Specifically, during their third and fourth entries, firms using seeding sequences took less 
time to capture their first sale, less time to break even, and had higher overall ratings of success after the 
first year than firms using soloing sequences (see Table 4).  Hence, a key insight is that while the use of 
soloing sequences leads to higher performance than the use of seeding sequences in the shorter-term (first 
two country entries), the pattern is reversed for performance in the longer-term (third and fourth entries)
because of expansion and contraction.
The expansion of seeding sequences seems to lead to higher performance for several reasons. First, 
it provides greater opportunities to learn.  This appeared to be the case for Wee when it learned from the 
advice of a partner in its third entry (a learning process the firm had not used until that point).  The firms 
General Manager recalled:
Our partner sent a group of engineers.  They would be in the room for days, going through the 
new features we have, testing them out and doing the user acceptance test.  They point out things 
that Singapore and Malaysia would miss. For example, a windows screen.  Sometimes there is box 
we click to say okay.  They said that the box is not the same size as the others.  I am not kidding 
you.  This is the level they go down to. The amount of improvements they can point out is 
tremendous. Because of this, the new version of our product, our monitoring system, benefited a lot 
of other countries as well.
The expansion of seeding sequences also appears to increase performance by improving the 
reliability of what is learned. More learning processes may provide a multi-modal method for 
triangulating data.  Hence, any finding or conclusion carries more weight and is likely to be more 
convincing if based on the pooling of several distinct, but corroboratory sources of information (Yin, 
Bateman, & Moore, 1983).  As one executive at Jackson noted about the increasing number of learning 
processes his firm relied on to make partner choices: By looking at our competitors, we get a very good 
gauge who the partnering companies are. Then we obviously supplement that with all the standard web 
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site press.  Also talking to analysts too.  We have been in contact with analysts who specialize in 
automotive aftermarket and OEMs and handsets asking them whats hot, whats interesting, and who are 
good companies coming up in this area.
More broadly, the use of many distinct learning processes may improve performance since it helps 
address a fundamental tradeoff between the speed of learning and the quality of what is learned. On the 
one hand, learning processes such as experimental learning and trial-and-error learning are time-
consuming, resource intensive and less efficient.  Yet the knowledge generated is often of high quality 
and so likely to reduce the future probability of mistakes (see Table 6).  On the other hand, vicarious 
learning is easy and efficient. But, because knowledge generated is based on weak causal inferences 
drawn from others observable actions it is of lower quality and so less likely to reduce the future 
probability of mistakes. The use of more learning processes in sequences may therefore let firms acquire 
quality information while also allowing for speed in action. Overall, while many studies portray a view 
where greater performance from learning stems from enlarging the number (Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Argote, 1999) or variety (Hayward, 2002; Schilling, Vidal, Ployhart, & Marangoni, 2003) of experiences
to be observed, our study portrays an complementary view where it can come from enlarging the number
and variety of learning processes used together in a single experience.
Data also suggest several reasons why the contraction of soloing sequences might lead to lower 
performance. First, increased reliance on trial-and-error alone increases the likelihood of repeating past 
actions that resulted in positive outcomes, but which may be inappropriate for current experience. A
senior leader at Tyler provided support for this point when he said, I dont think we did any external 
market research on Europe before entryour foray has been Well, this is what FDA approved.  
Therefore, it must be good for EuropeGuess what?  We sold nearly nothing, that doesnt work. This 
leader later admitted, We designed our product to meet U.S. requirements, because that was where we 
were and all the research that we did was catered to US.  So to watch it overseas and hope its going to 
sell is hope.
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Second, since critical examination of cause/effect relationships and the creation of new knowledge 
is severely reduced when individuals come to rely only on trial-and-error learning, performance also 
seems to decrease as executives become more influenced by psychological proclivities that push them to 
attribute the causes of negative outcomes to external factors (Weiner, 1985).  For example, while 
explaining the cause for his firms poor outcomes in Japan (country four), the CFO of Stahlberg stated, 
There has also been the problem that the Asian engineers are not as technically capable as the Finnish 
engineers. Likewise, while recounting his firms lack of sales in Latin America, Tylers Head of Global 
Sales snidely remarked, In European countries, they set up a high standard of health care.  In Latin 
America, half of them still use voodoo. In summary, less reflection about causal relationships stemming 
from the increased use of trial-and-error alone appears to increase the probability that assessments of 
unfavorable outcomes slip into a pattern of finger-pointing rather than occasions for learning.
Consequently, underlying but unresolved problems propagate over time so that performance gradually 
decreases with the accumulation of experience.  As support, the Co-founder of Tyler sadly admitted, 
Here we are years later and we have not yet found the key to completely succeeding with this particular 
product. Similarly, another member of the founding team disclosed, We have the same problems in 
Asia as in Europe, and we havent even started to get to that one yet. Collectively, these observations 
lead to our last group of propositions.
Proposition 5: Seeding learning sequences expand with use in later experience
Proposition 6: Soloing learning sequences contract with use in later experience 
Proposition 7: Use of a soloing learning sequence leads to lower performance in the longer-term 
than use of a seeding learning sequence 
DISCUSSION
Organizational learning is of fundamental importance since it enables innovation, adaptation, and 
improvement in efficiency and productivity (Argote, 1999). Yet most research generally explores how 
one particular learning process is used while underexploring whether firms use multiple learning 
processes together over time in temporally ordered ways.  Using data on the accumulated country entries 
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of entrepreneurial firms, we address this gap. Our findings have implications for several research areas, 
including process management, organizational learning and international entrepreneurship.
Process research and learning sequences 
Our primary contribution is to establish sequences as a meaningful focus and concept in process 
research on learning. Process research centers on understanding how things happen over time and why 
they happen this way (Langley, 1999; 2007). Whereas variance theories offer explanations for the world 
in terms of relationships independent and dependent variables (e.g., more of A leads to more of B), 
process theories offer explanations in terms of sequence of events, activities and choices (Langley, 1999).  
With process theory the concept of sequence thus takes center stage. Intriguingly, while much process 
theory on organizational learning exists (e.g., trial-and-error learning process or vicarious learning
process) - the concept of sequences is noticeably absent.  This absence may be partly attributable to the 
fact that organizational learning has a fluid character that makes it difficult to isolate distinct learning 
processes and their temporal ordering over time. However, by exploiting the benefits of inductive 
multiple case methods for time-series analysis (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994) we are able to 
overcome some of these challenges and develop the concept of sequence in organizational learning.
Consistent with other organizational research exploring sequences, we use the word sequence to 
refer to a temporally ordered list of elements (Abbott, 1990; Langley, 1999). In our study, we are 
concerned with the order of discrete learning processes used in firms.  In particular, we develop the 
concept of learning sequences by addressing the central questions in exemplar organizational process 
research on sequences: (1) questions about whether sequence patterns exist, (2) questions about what 
influences those patterns, and (3) questions about what is affected by the patterns (Abbott, 1990).
First, our study helps address the question of existence. Do learning sequences exist and, if so, are 
there typical patterns?  Our data reveal two primary patterns: seeding and soloing. With seeding 
sequences executives begin by using an indirect learning process before using a direct learning process. 
By contrast, with soloing sequences executives begin by using one direct learning process and then 
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switch to another direct learning process. Our data also reveal that there are variations of seeding and 
soloing sequences.  Thus, beyond showing support for the existence of learning sequences more 
generally, we also show support for common versions. For example, the most common version of soloing 
learning sequences used in initial country entries was firms starting with experimental learning and then 
transitioning to trial-and-error learning.  A less common version was firms starting with improvisational 
learning and then transitioning to trial-and-error learning.  Finally, our study provides some insight into 
the internal interdependencies in learning sequences and so helps address the question of whether certain 
orderings of learning processes are seldom or never used.  As one illustration, data show that 
experimental learning did not follow improvisational learning in any of the learning sequences uncovered 
in our sample firms. One explanation is that with improvisational learning there is a lower explicit intent
to learn, whereas with experimental learning there is a higher explicit intent to learn (Miner et al. 2001).  
Hence, because the goal of improvisational learning is more to address surprising problems and/or 
immediate opportunities, and less to gain information about causal laws, it is less likely that experimental 
learning, which centers on generating generalizeable knowledge, will follow it.  
Second, our study helps address the question of why initial learning sequence patterns exist.  We 
therefore explore factors that seem to influence whether seeding or soloing sequences get used.  We find 
that less international experience of TMT members makes firms more likely to use a seeding sequence in 
their initial country entry whereas more international experience of TMT members makes firms more 
likely to use a soloing sequence. Indirect learning therefore appears to seed direct learning when firms 
lack experience. Hence, while extant studies contribute by highlighting a range of potential learning 
processes (Huber, 1991; Miner et al., 2001), this study contributes by suggesting that sometimes there are 
constraints (e.g., lack of international experience) which may shape the order in which those processes
might be used together over time.
Similarly, the presence or lack of international experience also appears to influence why later 
learning sequence patterns exist. Unexpectedly, we find that initial learning sequences both contract and 
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expand with continued use. Soloing sequences contract. Executives with international experience appear 
to get over-confident. When executives are over confident they overestimate the likelihood they at they 
can rely on their existing stock of knowledge and personal abilities for success in later country entries.  
As one executive as F-Secure said smugly, I know what to do selling is selling, whatever you sell even 
if its a toothbrush.  You have the same points which you have to go through.  In each new country Im 
using the same model, selling exactly the same way. This finding provides insight into the finding of 
other learning scholars as to why firms may tend to exploit similar domain expertise when continuing to 
expand abroad (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Seeding sequences, alternatively, expand.  Executives 
with less international experience recognize their lack of knowledge and so come to rely on more 
learning processes when entering new countries to address this deficiency.  For example, after the first 
country entry one senior executive remarked, We are no longer just relying on the information that we 
think we have.
Finally, our study helps answer questions about the consequences of learning sequences.  We 
examined whether and how the order of learning processes used in a country entry influences country 
performance. We found that learning sequences differ in their shorter-term vs. longer-term performance 
impact. Soloing sequences appear better than seeding sequences in the shorter-term.  During this time 
frame soloing sequences involve more experimental learning than seeding sequences. The use of more 
experimental learning seems to be particularly performance enhancing early in experience (see Table 4) 
as the purpose of experimental learning is to gain new knowledge and practices that can then be 
incorporated into organizational activities. Thus, we find some empirical support for the conjectures of 
others that experimental learning may be useful in guiding subsequent trial-and-error learning (Miner et 
al., 2001).  
The use of soloing sequences, however, appears to result in lower performance than the use of 
seeding sequences in the longer-term. One possible reason for soloing sequences resulting in lower 
performance in the longer-term is that their continued use reflects a drift towards more local search (more 
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emphasis on just trial-and-error learning) over time. In contrast, the ongoing use of seeding sequences 
seems to reflect a drift towards more global search (e.g., more emphasis on different types of indirect 
learning processes). Prior research suggests that such global search is important for performance since it 
gives executives a fuller perspective, and thus make them less susceptible to various forms of learning 
biases (Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Levinthal & March, 1993). Therefore, while the knowledge generated from 
a global search may take awhile to integrate, once integrated it appears to give firms a knowledge edge in 
the longer-term. Hence, unlike prior studies that suggest indirect learning may become more emphasized 
as performance falls below aspirations (Baum & Dahlin, 2007) our study suggests it may become more 
emphasized as performance nears or exceeds aspirations. Indeed, the learning sequences that appeared to 
lead to the highest performance in the longer-term were ones that reflected more, and more distinct types 
of, indirect learning processes (see Table 4).
In sum, we contribute by showing that particular learning sequence patterns are present in 
organizations. We also address what influences the choice of and change in those sequences, and what 
those sequences mean for important organizational outcomes such as performance. Overall, our study 
helps reveal the existence, effects and evolution of learning sequences. Such revelation is important as 
existing process research on learning does not answer questions about whether there are learning 
sequences let alone questions dealing with the causes and consequences of them. Thus, we contribute to 
process research on learning by developing the concept of sequences, a concept that lies at the heart of 
process research (Burgelman, 1996; Graebner, 2004; Langley, 1989; Van de Ven & Polley, 1992) and 
one that scholars note is critical when developing theory about the temporal dynamics of strategy-related 
phenomena such as learning (Langley, 1999, 2007; Van De Ven, 1992; Van de Ven & Poole, 1995).
Organizational learning
Besides establishing sequences as a meaningful focus and concept in process research on 
learning, our study also adds to organizational learning research by shedding more nuanced light on the 
nature of common learning processes discussed in the literature (see Table 6).
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First, our study provides a more expanded view of how experimental learning occurs.  Extant 
literature describes how experimental learning takes place as leaders intentionally manipulate inputs off-
line and then observe outputs to gain knowledge and understanding of causal relationships (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979; Huber, 1991; Pisano, 1994; Thomke, 2003). Our data indicate that while experimental 
learning may occur off-line through controlled situations to test causal propositions and create new 
knowledge (which can then be implemented in ongoing organizational activities), it frequently occurs 
on-line as executive deliberately try variations of practices and products as they go. This is because the 
uncertainty associated with the technology-based environment in which our firms did business increases
the time pressure to take advantage of serendipitous opportunities faster than the competition.  A senior 
executive lent credence to this point when he remarked about his firms on-line experimental learning 
process of deciding which countries to enter, We throw out our seeds and see which one will germinate 
fastest.  Thus, finite attention and time, unpredictable windows of opportunity, and limited capital
increases the likelihood that fewer resources will be allocated towards off-line experimental learning of 
projects that might be potentially valuable sometime in the future and that more resources will be 
allocated towards on-line experimental learning of possibilities for immediate revenue. 
Second, our study provides a more expanded view of how vicarious learning occurs. Current studies 
on vicarious learning tend to describe one particular form of vicarious learning  a modeling effect, 
defined as replication of a competitors behavior (Denrell, 2003; Kim & Miner, 2007).  However, while 
this study shows support for vicarious learning via a modeling effect, it also shows that vicarious learning 
may also take the form of several different, but less understood, effects.  Data indicate that sometimes 
vicarious learning may have an inhibitory effect, defined as ceasing behavior after observing another firm 
experience a negative outcome for pursuing that behavior.  For example, in one firm, executives learned 
to create a more lightweight product prior to entering the U.S. from watching competitors suffer with a 
product that was not lightweight.  The country manager of the U.S. said, We actually learned a lot from 
the pioneers out there. We have learned that the total cost of ownership is an issue when loading a lot of 
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heavy duty software for companies. So scalability for them has been an issue. We decided we were going 
to go for lightweight softwarehaving seen where firms have gone and not really succeeded helps us be
better.  
Vicarious learning may also have an eliciting effect, defined as engaging in a behavior similar to a 
competitor firm but in a different way. To illustrate, by watching their U.S.-based competitors leaders in 
one firm realized the importance of having a U.S. presence so that they could have added legitimacy for 
Asian customers. A senior executive remarked, We realized that it was important to have an American 
baseOne of our competitors in Taiwan at the time was (firm) and they had a strong American presence. 
They had a Taiwanese reseller for them. They were an American company with a Taiwanese reseller. So, 
it somehow worked out really well for them, because their Taiwanese reseller was able to leverage the 
American image in the Taiwanese market.  
International entrepreneurship
We also contribute to the growing literature on international entrepreneurship.  Many studies in this 
research stream describe how new firms internationalize shortly after founding in pursuit of performance 
advantages (Autio, George, & Alexy, 2011; Autio, Sapienza, & Almeida, 2000; Bingham, 2009; 
Sapienza et al., 2006; Zahra et al., 2000). Our study improves understanding of how these performance 
advantages might be realized and when.  
First, we contribute by showing how determinants of performance advantages in the shorter-term
may lead to performance disadvantages in the longer-term.  Previous studies suggest that the first entry of 
an entrepreneurial firm can be challenging due to liabilities of both newness and foreignness (Zaheer & 
Mosakowski, 1997).  But, recent theoretical work by Sapienza and colleagues (2006) posits that the prior 
international experience of executives may serve as a partial substitute for lack of organizational 
experience and so mitigate the aforementioned liabilities.  Sapienza and colleagues thus suggest that 
entrepreneurial firms where executives have previous international experience will perform higher in 
their first country entry than entrepreneurial firms where executives do not have that experience.  Our 
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empirical study supports and extends this work.  We find that entrepreneurial firms where executives had 
more previous international experience generally exhibited higher average performance in their first two 
country entries than entrepreneurial firms where executives had less previous international experience. 
However, our study also suggests that early performance advantages in initial country entries may lead to 
over confidence in experienced executives and so lead to less learning and lower performance in later 
country entries.  Hence, prior international experience of executives seems to generate shorter-term 
performance advantages but longer-term performance disadvantages.  In general, our finding on the 
dampening effect of overconfidence on learning and performance over time helps address the question in 
the international entrepreneurship literature of whether the imprinting of early executives provides 
continued performance advantages (Autio et al., 2011). It is also consistent with other research on 
entrepreneurial firms which suggests that executive teams with greater confidence tend to deprive their 
firms of important opportunities for learning and therefore increase the likelihood that their firms will 
underperform in the their industries (Hayward, Shepherd, & Griffin, 2006). 
Second, we contribute by showing how determinants of performance disadvantages in the shorter-
term may lead to performance advantages in the longer-term.  We find that entering a new country for the 
first time is a costly exercise for entrepreneurial firms, especially when executives do not have previous 
international experience. Lack of experience causes some leaders to begin learning indirectly (see Table 
3).  Yet because indirect learning often consists of making weak causal inferences for effective actions 
based on distant observations of others behaviors (Kim & Miner, 2007), it can result in incomplete and 
even inaccurate understandings that can lead to lower performance in initial country entries relative to 
entrepreneurial firms where executives have previous international experience.  However, our data also 
show that relatively inexperienced firms that performed lower in initial country entries rebound by 
adding more learning processes (see also Table 3) and so perform better in later country entries.  This
finding on the increasing number and diversity of learning processes used over time may provide 
additional intuition for why some entrepreneurial firms are able to develop a larger and more diverse 
35
action repertoire for new country entry over time (Autio et al., 2011). More broadly, this finding helps
extend the important concept of learning advantages of newness discussed in the international 
entrepreneurship literature (Autio et al., 2000) to executive, and not just organizational, experience. Autio 
and colleagues (2000) argued that younger firms are better able to internationalize than older firms since 
older firms have more structure and other institutional constraints that make them increasingly resistant 
to change.   Similarly, we find that executives with less international experience prior to their current 
entrepreneurial venture appear to do more learning over the longer-term (i.e., increase the number of 
learning processes used in new country entries) than those executives with more prior international 
experience and so outperform them in later country entries.  By highlighting how learning advantages of 
newness might well be relevant at the individual level of analysis (in addition to the firm level) our work 
suggests the intriguing notion that inexperienced founders may constitute a more important long-term 
source of competitive advantage for entrepreneurial firms entering new markets than previously 
theorized.
Limitations
Like all studies, ours has limitations that suggest opportunities for future research. To more 
accurately portray learning sequences over multiple experiences we restricted our analysis to nine firms. 
Although we found intriguing patterns, more work is needed to examine learning sequences across a 
larger number of firms and across a wider range of industries. Likewise, we focus on learning across a 
series of country entry experiences. It would therefore be valuable to explore how our findings generalize 
(or not) during experience with other strategically relevant motors for growth such as alliances, 
acquisitions or product development. In addition, our sample consists of small, young firms in which 
learning may be more critical to survival than for more established firms. Although a focus on younger 
firms may allow for greater transparency of learning, understanding the existence, causes and 
consequences of learning sequences in older firms is also needed. Similarly, we focus on the information 
technology industry. It may be that this dynamic setting increases the number and range of opportunities 
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to learn. Finally, although we identify particular learning sequences that seem to lead to higher 
performance than others in the shorter and longer-terms, future research is needed to continue exploring 
which sequences are better and under what conditions. More generally, all research designs make 
tradeoffs due to the practical limits of data collection. We chose a small sample to allow rich examination
of learning sequences and their potential causes and consequences. However, while this choice increases 
the likelihood that findings will be fresh and internally valid, it does so at the expense of generalizeability 
and external validity. Thus, an important next step is to submit our findings and emergent propositions to 
rigorous empirical test.
Conclusion
We know much about the importance of learning and particular learning processes that 
organizations use (e.g., trial-and-error learning or vicarious learning). But, we know too little about if
multiple learning processes get used together in learning sequences. Our work is a first step in 
addressing this gap. It is also part of a larger research program that not only addresses how learning 
occurs from experience (Bingham, 2009), but also what is learned (Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011), the 
impact of that learned content (Bingham et al., 2007; Davis, Eisenhardt, and Bingham, 2009; Eisenhardt, 
Furr, and Bingham, 2010) and why some firms learn more than others (Bingham and Haleblian, 2011).
From our exploration of rich field data, we find the existence of learning sequences. Moreover, we 
find that learning sequences seem to reflect two broad patterns: seeding and soloing.  These two patterns
have variations across firms and their adoption is influenced by the prior international experience of 
executives. Our study also suggests that learning sequences evolve over time, but in opposing ways. 
Seeding sequences expand, while soloing sequences contract.  Further, our study suggests that the 
performance benefits associated with each learning sequence are contingent upon when it is used; 
Soloing sequences seem to lead to higher performance than seeding sequences in the shorter-term 
whereas the reverse appears true for the longer-term. In sum, this study provides an emergent and 
empirically grounded model for the existence, evolution, and effect of learning sequences.  More 
37
broadly, our study highlights the sequential nature of key strategic organizational processes thereby 
suggesting that through careful in-depth analysis intriguing new insights may emerge in many other areas 
of management research beyond learning.
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Table 1: Description of firms
Firm
HQ
Product Sales and 
employees11
Year   
founded
First four 
country 
entries 
(in order)
Cult 
dist. to
HQ12
Entry 
mode13
Importance of country 
entry14
Additional data
Wee
Singapore
IT security 
monitoring
$3.2M 100 2000 Hong Kong 
Malaysia 
Japan 
China 
0.28
0.85
5.15
0.47
2
2
2
3
International expansion 
is key in our expansion 
plan.
- 42 archival documents 
-One day of on-site meetings/observations at 
corporate HQ in Singapore
-Follow-up interview with CEO
Jackson
U.S.
Wireless 
chips for 
mobile 
devices
$1M 100 1999 China 
Taiwan 
Korea 
Japan 
3.01
2.80
3.39
2.63
5
5
1
1
We were founded from 
the beginning to be a 
multi-site intl 
company.
- 6 archival documents 
- Two days of on-site meetings/observations 
in US HQ
-Follow-up interview with Dir. Of Mktg.
Ryti
Finland
Clinical data 
capture 
solutions
$9.3M 75 2000 Sweden 
US 
Czech Rep.
Germany 
0.74
1.37
1.13
1.21
5
5
5
5
Its vital, its the 
cornerstone.  Its the 
only way to go forward.
- One day onsite in Finland HQ
- Discussions with Finnish professor 
advising TMT 
-11 archival documents 
-Follow-up int. with Co-founder
Kallio
Finland
Wireless 
solutions
$1.5M 35 1999 Italy 
Switzerland
Ireland
UK
1.76
1.44
1.58
1.70
3
3
3
4
Theres no choice to 
not be international. 
- One day onsite in Finland HQ
- Discussions with local advisor 
-Business case on firm
-Follow-up int. with Co-founder
Adams
U.S.
Real time 
analytics 
(supply 
chain, 
CRMs)
$8.5M 65 1996 Australia 
UK
France 
Germany 
0.02
0.08
1.54
0.41
1
5
1
1
Ultimately you need to 
become global.
-10 archival documents 
-One day of on-site meetings/observations in 
US HQ
-Follow-up interview with former Chairman
Stahlberg
Finland
Security 
software 
solutions
$13.9M 104 1996 Sweden
Germany 
US
Japan
.
0.74
1.21
1.37
4.34
1
5
5
5
From the beginning, a 
high degree of vision 
and concept around 
doing what was right for 
the global market.
-Discussions with board member
- Press releases and  industry reports
- One day (each) of on-site meetings in US 
and Finland
-Follow-up interview with U.S. CEO
Polk
U.S.
Security 
software 
solutions
$11M 100 1996 China
Germany
Switzerland
UK
3.01
0.41
0.34
0.08
5
1
1
5
We have  a global 
customer so just de 
facto, we have to be 
international.  
- 20 archival documents
-One day of on-site meetings/observations at 
corporate HQ in U.S.
-Follow-up interview with CEO
Tyler
U.S.
Clinical data 
capture 
solutions
$70M 192 1994 Sweden
Netherlands
Germany
Japan
2.73
1.77
0.41
2.63
1
1
1
1
It is a global problem 
that we are trying to 
solve. Its not limited to 
the US.
-Follow-up discussions with CEO
-six years of press reports and industry 
documentation on firm
-Three days of onsite meetings in U.S. HQ.
Nair
Singapore
Medical 
software 
solutions
$1.8M 10 2000 India
Japan
Australia
Malaysia
0.80
5.15
3.66
0.85
3
3
3
3
We have to go 
international  it is 
unavoidable.
-One day of meetings in HQ
- Discussions with advisor to TMT 
-13 archival documents 
-Follow-up int. with CEO
  
11 Assessed at the end of data collection
12 Cultural distance of focal country from HQ nation is calculated based on Hofestede (1980) rank scores.  
13 1=Distributor, 2=Joint Venture, 3=Alliance, 4=Acquisition, 5=Greenfield
14 Examples are representative quotes
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Table 2: Description of informants
Firm
HQ
Informants Age Nation of birthWhen joined 
firm
Prior 
experience 
with TMT
Adjectives used by other 
informants to describe focal 
informant
Jackson
U.S.
Director of Mtkng 
Marketing Manager
CEO and Founder
22
23
60
U.S.
U.S.
China
Founding
2003
Founding
No
No
No
Quick learner
Knows U.S and Chinese culture
Seasoned entrepreneur
Ryti
Finland
VP of Operations
Co-fnder /VP Tech.
Co-fnder/ VP Bus. D.
Co-fnder/VP of Tech.
28
28
25
27
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Founding
Founding
Founding
Founding
No 
Yes
Yes
Yes
Thorough and calm
Innovative, get-it-done
Smart, proactive
Hardworking, straightforward
Wee
Singapore
CEO and Co-found.
GM, Singapore
CEO, Malaysia
45
38
36
Hong Kong
Singapore
Malaysia
Founding
Founding
2001
Yes
No
Yes
Dynamic, fast, great side-view
Technically sound
Strategic thinker, can talk at all levels
Kallio
Finland
EVP, Marketing
Co-fnder, VP Sales
CEO
Co-founder
29
27
36
28
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
Founding
Founding
Founding
Founding
No 
Yes
No
Yes
Analytical, able to consolidate 
thoughts 
Able to cope with new situations
Friendly, impulsive
Direct, technical
Adams
U.S.
Founder/ Chairman
VP of International
Manager, UK
VP and Dir. of Aust.
50
48
47
34
UK
UK
UK
Australia
Founding
Founding
1999
1999
No
No
No
No
Mr. International
Professional
Process-oriented
Good entrepreneur
Stahlberg
Finland
US CEO
CEO 
CFO
Founder
Dir. Central Europe
President, Japan
55
52
43
33
47
40
U.S.
Finland
Finland
Finland
Finland
French
1997
2000
Founding
Founding
2002
2000
No
No
No
No
No
No
A sales and marketing-oriented person
Stubborn, focused
Analytical
Brilliant, intense, highly focused
Unconventional, maverick
Could sell snow cones to Eskimos
Polk
U.S.
CEO and President
UK Director
CTO, Founder
45
39
50
U.S.
New Zealand
China
1997
2003
Founding
No
No
No
Impatient
Scrappy, likes a lot of balls in the air
Technical
Tyler
U.S.
Chairman and CEO
Principal engineer
Staff Scientist
Head of Sales
Eur. & S. A. Mngr.
CSO, Co-founder
Director of Sales
COO
53
50
31
49
55
56
46
52
U.S.
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
Belgium
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
2000
Founding
1997
2000
2002
Founding
2000
1997
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Upbeat
Intelligent
Laidback, talented in engineering
Has a good perspective
Knows how to do global business 
Forward thinker
Sales oriented
Defensive
Nair
Singapore
CEO and Founder
VP of Bus. Dev.
Bus. Director, USA
38
30
38
Singapore
Singapore
Malaysia
Founding
Founding
2003
Yes
No
Yes
Reserved, methodical
Polite, optimistic
Hardworker, concise in 
communication
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Table 3: Learning sequences 
Firm S15 Country 1 International experience of TMT at time of Country 1
Ryti V16T Low  1 year
Among the founding team, there is a lot of inexperience.
Jackson AT Low - 2 years
My role in China was to validate that the market is there, and that our solution 
is competitive (VP overseeing entry who has no international experience.)  
Wee VT Medium - 4 years
He (one co-founder) lived in Australia for five years...I worked for two years 
in the U.K. and a year an a half in New Zealand.
Kallio
SE
ED
IN
G
ATI Low - <1 year
I (co-founder) lived for two months in Buenos Aires. How long has (other 
co-founder) lived outside Finland? Its countable in months not years. He lived 
in the Ivory Coast for one summer but thats the longest.
Tyler ET High - 6 years
John essentially had the long-term experience as an international salesperson.  
He had been in the industry for a long time and had a lot of sales contacts, 
basically knew how to process work.  Hanz had worked for him in Sweden.
Adams ET High - 13 years
Most of my jobs for the last 15-20 years have had an international context in 
the sense I have managed businesses outside my home country.
He has lived and worked in South Africa, the U.K., Europe, and the United 
States. His experience has been exclusively global from the get go. 
Stahlberg IT High - 6 years
We can speak the same language, we know the country, and we know the 
company.  I have lived and worked outside my home country for almost 20 
years. He had been a sales manager in Germany for Nokia previously for a 
year or twoI also had some experience in dealing with Germany.
Polk ET High - 10 years
We have international experience here, so we brainstorm a little bit about 
what we should do and how we should do it.I (CEO) have about 22 years of 
international experience.  Our manager for China has lived outside China 
for about 8-9 years
Nair
SO
LO
IN
G
ETE Medium - 4 years
I (Malaysian executive) have been in the U.S. for four years.  I also spent three 
years at the Center for Natural Products Research in Singapore.
Firm S Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4
Ryti VT VATE I ATE ADTE
Jackson AT ATDI ATI ATAI
Kallio ATI ATE ATEV ADTV
Wee S
EE
D
IN
G
VT VTID ATI VTVI
Tyler ET T ET T
Adams ET ET ET T
Stahlberg IT IT T T
Polk ET IT IT T
Nair
SO
LO
IN
G
ETE ET EA TA TA
  
15 Learning sequence 
16 V= Vicarious learning, T= Trial-and-error learning, A=Learning from external advice of others (via contact), I=Improvisational learning, 
E= Experimental learning, D=Deviance-error learning. Please see Appendices 1 and 2 for more specific detail on learning sequences used by 
each sample firm in each of its country entries.
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Figure 1: Learning sequence evolution
Seeding
Soloing
46
(A) ST time until first 
sale*
(B) ST time to break 
even
(C) ST success first 
year
(D) LT time until first 
sale
(E) LT time to   break 
even
(F) LT success first 
year
(countries 1 and 2) (countries 1 and 2) (countries 1 and 2) (countries 3 and 4) (countries 3 and 4) (countries 3 and 4) A B C D E F  Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4
Wee 7 24 4 7 18 6 7 6 8 6 5 3 VT VTID ATI VTVI
Kallio 5 5 7 2 3 9 5 2 3 1 1 1 ATI ATE ATEV ADTV
Ryti 8 48 5 5 12 5 8 8 7 3 3 6 VT ATEVI ATE ADTE
Jackson 6 36 7 4 19 9 6 7 3 2 7 1 AT ATDI ATI ATAI
Stahlberg 3 13 7 6 27 6 1 5 3 4 8 3 IT IT T T
Tyler N/A N/A 3 N/A N/A 2 9 9 9 9 9 9 ET T ET T
Adams 4 8 7 14 14 4 2 4 3 8 4 7 ET ET ET T
Polk 4 6 8 6 10 3 2 3 1 4 2 8 ET IT IT T
Nair 4 4 8 9 18 6 2 1 1 7 5 3 ET E ET EA TA TA
*  in months
Se
ed
in
g
So
lo
in
g
Specific learning sequences Ranking among sample
0
2
4
6
8
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12
14
16
STtime until first sale LTtime until first sale
0
1
2
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5
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8
9
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STsuccess 1st yr LT success 1st yr
Table 4:  Performance consequences of learning sequences 
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Soloing
M
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M
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Table 5: Learning sequence performance consequences
48
Table 6: Learning processes
Direct Learning Processes Indirect Learning ProcessesLearning 
processes Experimental 
learning
Trial-and-error 
learning
Improvisational 
learning
Deviance-error 
learning
Vicarious 
learning
Learning from 
external advice 
Definition Learning through  
controlled situations to 
test causal propositions 
and create new 
knowledge (Cook & 
Campbell, 1979).
Learning through 
the consequences 
of a firms 
previous actions 
(Baum and Dahlin, 
2007)
Learning that occurs 
on the fly as design 
and action converge 
(Miner et al., 2001)
Learning that occurs 
when firms break 
away from a 
successful action 
pattern
Learning indirectly 
from other firms 
through observation but 
without contact 
(Bandura, 1977)
Learning from others 
instruction through
direct contact (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 2000)
How learning 
occurs
Through the 
intentional 
manipulation of 
inputs and 
observation of outputs 
firms gain knowledge 
and understanding of 
causal relationships.
Firms undertake a 
course of action 
and the 
consequences of 
that completed 
action lead to 
change in 
inferences of 
action.
Firms adjust their 
beliefs and/or 
behavior in real-
time (without 
waiting for 
consequences of 
action) in order to 
solve unexpected 
problems or capture 
surprising 
opportunities. 
Firms deviate away 
from a previously 
successful action 
pattern, the result is
a performance drop 
and a return to the 
previously used 
action.  Firms learn 
the true importance 
of a prior action 
pattern when they 
deviate from it and 
see performance dip.
May take the form of (1) 
a modeling effect (a focal 
firm replicates a 
competitors behavior)
(2) an inhibitory effect 
(i.e., ceasing behavior 
after observing another 
firm experience a 
negative outcome for 
pursuing that behavior) 
or (3) an eliciting effect 
(i.e., engaging in an 
action like a competitor 
but doing it differently).
Firms adjust their 
understandings and/or 
action through 
instruction from 
external firms.  Often 
these firms include 
partners, VCs, or 
members of industry 
associations.
Explicit intent to 
learn
High. Goal is to 
develop new 
understandings that 
can then be 
incorporated into 
ongoing 
organizational 
activities. 
Medium. Trial-and-
error may be used 
as a deliberate form 
of learning.  Trial-
and-error may also 
be blind and 
involve little intent 
to learn.
Low.  Goal is more 
to address 
surprising problems 
and/or opportunities 
and less to gain
knowledge about 
action/outcome
relationships
Medium. May be a 
deliberate form of 
learning. May also 
be less deliberate as 
deviance from a 
successful action 
pattern in the past is 
done not with goal to 
learn but to capture a 
novel opportunity.
High. Goal is to gain 
the benefits of 
accumulated knowledge 
while avoiding the 
expense of accumulated 
experience.
High. Firms hire outside 
others and/or ask 
targeted questions to 
help cover particular 
deficiencies in internal 
stock of knowledge.
Reliance on what 
was done in the 
past
High. Outcomes from 
off-line and on-line 
experiments are 
carefully compared 
with what the firms 
has done in the past.
Medium.  Firms 
repeat past actions 
that resulted in 
positive outcomes. 
If outcomes are not 
positive, they revise 
beliefs and/or 
actions as needed. 
Low.  Design and 
action converge in 
time and result in a 
novel production 
that is idiosyncratic 
to time and place.
Low.  Firms move 
away from effective 
actions used in the 
past. But doing so 
helps them better 
understand the 
reason for those 
actions. 
Low.  Firms use 
vicarious learning to 
jumpstart action since 
they often do not have 
an experience base to 
draw upon.
Low.  Firms move away 
from own stock of 
knowledge built from 
the past and rely more 
heavily on the
knowledge of others.
Relation with other 
learning processes
May be used to guide 
trial-and-error 
learning 
May drive out 
indirect-
organizational
learning
May lead to longer 
term trial-and-error
learning (Miner et 
al. 2001) 
May be a viewed as 
a form of unplanned 
experimental 
learning 
May be used to seed
direct learning 
May seed direct
learning and become 
used more than 
vicarious learning
Exploration/ 
exploitation 
emphasis
Exploration: Decision 
makers deliberately 
manipulate inputs to 
discover new 
knowledge and 
practices.
Exploitation: Own 
experience is 
usually not a 
source of new 
ideas but a basis 
for refinement of 
existing ones.
Exploitation: 
Intention is to make 
do with materials at 
hand to create a 
solution for an 
emergent problem 
and/or opportunity.
Exploration: 
Decision makers 
deviate from 
practices that proved 
successful in prior 
experience.
Exploration: Decision 
makers engage in non-
local search when they 
look beyond their 
boundaries for new ideas 
and practices. Often ideas 
come from firms in the 
same industry.
Exploration: Firms
engage in non- local 
search. May be more 
global than vicarious 
learning since external 
sources of information 
are not necessarily in 
the same industry.
Potential benefits 
and detriments
Benefit: Knowledge 
generated may be 
generalizeable over 
time given that it 
contains 
understanding about 
main and interaction 
effects
Detriment:  
Experimentation can 
be costly in terms of 
resources and time 
away from core 
activities
Benefit: Learning 
can gradually and 
systematically 
build off errors 
committed in the 
past
Detriment: Errors 
may have been 
avoided through 
experimentation or 
vicarious learning
Benefit: Allows 
firms to rapidly 
respond to attractive 
emergent 
opportunities faster 
than the competition
Detriment: 
Knowledge is short-
term and 
idiosyncratic to 
particular 
experiences and so 
less generalizeable 
over time 
Benefit: Knowledge 
generated reflects 
more understanding 
for why successful 
actions used in the 
past are successful.
Detriment:  can be 
costly in that firms 
deviate from 
successful actions 
only to see a drop in 
performance and 
then a return to that 
successful action.
Benefit: Expedites 
learning by avoiding 
direct trial-and-error
Detriment: Knowledge 
gained could be less 
useful given that it is 
based on making weak 
causal inferences from 
observation of behavior 
(i.e., involves drawing 
inferences from noisy 
data)
Benefit: Expedites 
learning by avoiding 
direct trial-and-error. 
Also improves weak 
inferences made through 
vicarious learning.
Detriment: Costs to hire 
external sources to help 
instruct and cover 
informational 
deficiencies could be 
high. Also requires that 
firms know deficiencies 
a priori.
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Appendix 1: Seeding learning sequences
Firm Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4
Ryti V17T
V: Saw from other firms in 
the industry that trials were 
key and easy to get in 
Sweden so leaders started to 
get trials there too.
T: During project 
implementation with 
Swedish customer (action) 
the customer became 
frustrated with poor 
communication (outcome). 
Leaders worked to improve 
corporate communication 
with customers through 
company intranet and 
dedicated email lists 
(change in behavior)
VATE I
V: Watched where competitor firms were located in 
the U.S. and then set up an office in that location 
(Cambridge, MA)
A: FinnPro helped establish an office, screen market 
and create intros to lawyers, VCs and banks.
T: Leaders established an office and contacted 
customers (action) but were told that their image 
wasnt sophisticated enough (outcome). As a result, 
leaders hired a PR firm and marketing agency, and 
moved to a nicer office (change in behavior). 
E: Leaders intentionally tried different sales 
approaches (mailing, direct sales, email shots, trade 
events) to determine which was most appropriate. 
Direct sales was best and so used more (change).
I: In negotiations with customer leaders discovered 
that the standard front-end payment schedule wasnt 
accepted and so they altered it on the fly to be back-
end loaded (change in behavior).  
ATE
A: Relied on FinnPro for advice about 
where to establish an E. European 
office. FinnPro said that much pharma 
activity was occurring in C. Republic 
and so leaders entered based on this 
data.
T: Had interest from potential 
customers in the C. Republic (action) 
but few had money for solutions 
(outcome). Leaders changed
qualification questions to uncover the 
ability to pay early in discussions 
(change in behavior)
E:  Tested many European markets to 
find a beachhead. Leaders saw that 
Germany had lots of pharma HQ and 
so decided to move to Germany 
(change in behavior)
ADTE
A: Relied on FinnPro for basic market data. 
D: Management had always sent a Finn to 
open a new country who spoke the language. 
This time they did not and it caused 
communication problems. Sending a non-
German speaking sales lead clarified the 
importance of sending in a Finn who speaks 
the local language (change in cognition).
T: Tried to do business with German pharma 
firms, but realized that customers were risk 
averse (outcome). Leaders switched to German 
contracts to offset fears of doing business with 
a non-German firm (change in behavior)
E:  Leaders deliberately decided not to create a 
legal entity for the German venture but try 
using a satellite office.  They found that the 
satellite office reduced complexity and seemed 
to be a better solution for new country entries.
Jackson AT
A:  Learned from consultant 
that firms need to work with 
multiple distributors in 
China since the market is so 
big and diverse across 
regions. Leaders began 
working with multiple 
distributors (change in 
behavior)
T: When trying to do 
business with Chinese 
(action), leaders learned that 
that Chinese didnt want to 
buy semiconductors 
(outcome) they only 
wanted turn-key solutions. 
Leaders began providing 
turn-key solutions (change 
in behavior).
ATDI
A:  Consultant provided insight about the right firms 
to target when entering Taiwan. Leaders targeted 
these firms when entering (change in behavior)
T: In discussions with Taiwanese firms (action), 
leaders found out that the CEO often was not final
decision maker (outcome) rather it was someone at a 
lower level. Leaders changed sales approach to 
appeal to lower level too (change in behavior)
D: Moved away from using indirect sales through 
distributors (as in first country China) to focus on 
direct sales for entry into Taiwan. Realized in Taiwan 
the need to re-focus on indirect sales in future 
markets to improve speed to market and bridge lack 
of local understanding (change in cognition). 
I: Improvised product during delivery to Taiwanese 
customer who just wanted development boards with 
documentation and support instead of complete turn-
key solution (change in behavior). Firm leaders 
offered this no frills solution in later countries.
ATI
A: Consultant told firm about which 
Korean distributors to work with. 
Leaders pursued these distributors 
(change in behavior)
T:  During discussions with potential 
customers (action) leaders discovered 
Korean firms wanted to start design 
right away and not wait (outcome).  
Leader expedited their design phase 
(change in behavior)
I: In the middle of sales pitch to a 
prominent Korean firm, the VP 
improvised the sales pitch to more 
strongly emphasize features after 
Korean customer appeared less 
concerned with price and more 
concerned with features. Leaders 
relied on the new sales pitch in later 
meetings with customers.
ATAI
A: Spoke to prototypical large Japanese firms
to gain insight about demands in Japan. 
Leaders learned that in Japan reliability is the 
first concern and price is the second.
T: Leaders started using local distributors after 
entering (action). This wasnt effective 
(outcome) and so started using large, global 
implementation partners (change in behavior)
A: Japanese implementation partners helped 
leaders better understand the factors local firms 
would consider (e.g., ISO 9000 certification, 
escrow accounts).   Leaders adjusted their sales 
timeline (change in cognition) since they saw it 
would take longer than anticipated to close 
deals.
I: Improvised projection figures in meeting 
after learning that firms were interested in 
price of chips at time of shipping not current 
pricing. Learned to better clarify expectations.
Wee VT
V: Focused on information 
security software based on 
watching what was done in 
the physical world by a 
prominent firm in Singapore
(change in behavior)
T: Leaders used sales 
approach of approaching IT 
leaders within customer 
organizations (action). This 
did not work out as many 
firms had transferred 
responsibility for IT 
security out of IT and into 
audit (outcome). Leaders 
began targeting audit groups 
instead of IT groups 
(change in behavior).
VTID
V: Decided to promote solutions on 24x7 services 
based on watching a few firms in the U.S. and 
Europe (change in behavior)
T: Entered Malaysia promoting 24x7 security 
monitoring solutions (action). But, the limited IT 
infrastructure made firms reluctant to make purchases 
(outcome). Leaders backward integrated into security 
infrastructure (change in behavior).
I: Inability to get government account caused leaders 
to improvise a new conceptualization of their target 
customer as large firms with proprietary data and 
that ability to pay so that they could quickly capture 
an emergent opportunity with an insurance firm.
D: Entered Malaysia without funding of JV partners 
(had funding in first country - Hong Kong). Leaders 
learned they needed JVs to provide resources for in 
country growth and so decided to get a JV partner 
and use one for future entries (change in behavior).
ATI
A: Relied on local partner in Japan to 
help know what to change in their 
product for the Japanese market 
(change in behavior)
T: Leaders tried to promote sales but 
did not have the track record in Japan 
to establish legitimacy and so 
customers felt less comfortable about 
outsourcing their IT security 
(outcome). Leaders began to rely more 
on local partner for selling (change in 
behavior).
I: Leaders improvised off 
conceptualization of their target 
customer to capture an emergent 
opportunity with a large mfg firm 
(change in cognition). Learned a 
broader view of target customers.
VTVI
V: Entry of competitor firms into large market 
of China helped persuade firm to do the same 
(change in behavior). 
T: CEO created an alliance with a local partner 
to help promote sales (action). But, little sales 
were achieved (outcome) and leaders realized 
that because of the size of the country, having 
a cross-regional partner was ineffective. So, 
they decided to start using multiple partners for 
different geographies (change in behavior). 
V: Leaders saw other foreign firms exiting 
China during SARS when sales plummeted. 
They followed suit (change in behavior).
I:  When packaging its software for a customer, 
leaders heard that the customer would only pay 
for hardware so engineers decided to bundle its
software in a physical box (change in action).
Used physical box option in later entries.
Kallio ATI
A: FinnPro provided market 
knowledge and contacts for 
potential customers in Italy.
T: After implementing pilot
in Italy (action) where 
infrastructure was poor 
(outcome) leaders decided 
to do future pilots in host 
countries (change in action)
I: Engineers discovered they 
needed to develop 10 more 
features than what was 
piloted. Leaders learned to 
only offer features that had 
previously been tested 
(change in cognition)
ATE
A: FinnPro provided market knowledge about who 
are the potential customers in the country. Leaders 
pursued these when entering.
T: Project leader negotiated features with customer 
without R&D input (action). R&D resisted making 
changes (outcome) and leader learned to not to 
promise feature that is not already developed and 
tested (change in behavior)
E: Leaders tried different negotiation tactics (i.e., 
with and without senior member). Having the senior 
member provided more credibility to customers and 
so leaders started bringing him to future meetings 
with client. 
ATEV
A: Relied on documentation of 
implementation partner.
T:  Working with a partner created 
customer communication problems 
(outcome). Leaders started 
communicating more transparently and 
actively (change in behavior). 
E: Tried a new way to manage 
customer accounts. Compared to old 
method, the new method helped buffer 
R&D from customer complaints and 
so was continued in each new entry.
V: Self-compared against U.S. 
competitor startups expanding abroad. 
Leaders learned theyd accomplished the 
same thing with 6 times less funding.
ADTV
A: Spoke to competitors like Wistow and
Seven to understand how they created the same 
value proposition with different approaches.
D: Moved away from focus on Europe to 
explore merger with US firm. Leaders received 
low valuations and so decided to re-focus on 
Europe. They realized that the real reason for 
remaining Europe focused was to master the 
continent (change in cognition). 
T: When trying to buy a U.K. firm, leaders had
resistance from Swedish investors (outcome). 
Leaders realized they needed to spend more time 
convincing constituents (change in cognition).
V: Leaders imitated Blackberrys approach but 
in an open European market (change in 
behavior)
  
17 V= Vicarious learning, T= Trial-and-error learning, A=Learning from others (via contact), I=Improvisational learning, E= Experimental learning; 
D=Deviance-error learning
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Appendix 2: Soloing learning sequences
Firm Country 1 Country 2 Country 3 Country 4
Tyler ET
E:  Entered Sweden since it was a 
country with nationalized medicine and 
firm leaders believed doctors in these 
countries would be more receptive to 
technology (controlled situation to test 
proposition).  After trying to get trials 
started (action), leaders saw skepticism 
for their technology (outcome) and so 
decided to better educate local doctors 
(change in behavior).
T: Tried to get doctors who were excited 
about the technology to create a 
purchase order (action) but they didnt 
want to buy (outcome). Discovered that 
doctors often didnt make decisions. 
Rather it was made by government 
official and so leaders needed to solicit 
them (change in cognition).
T
T:  Entered Netherlands because leaders 
knew a few prominent radiologists.  After 
demonstrating analog technology with 
radiologists (action), leaders saw that local 
firms were not interested in their analog 
product (outcome). Instead, leaders 
discovered local radiologists wanted a digital 
CAD solution (change in cognition). Because 
they didnt have a digital CAD solution, 
leaders decided to push their analog product 
more aggressively (change in behavior).
T:  Managers tried to better promote analog 
product to local doctors (action) but were told 
that their product was too big for the mobile 
units many doctors were using (outcome).  
Decided that local medical system promoted 
efficiency over effectiveness (change in 
cognition)
ET
E:  Entered Germany because it was 
believed to be a big market, with 
nationalized medicine and many prominent 
doctors with money to pay for technology 
(controlled situation to test proposition). 
Leaders found that while the market was 
big, doctors did not want to use clinical trial 
data from other countries (outcome).  This 
helped leaders realize that the sales process 
would take much longer than anticipated 
(change in cognition).
T: Had local doctors begin using technology 
to conduct trials (action). Trials seemed to 
suggest benefits but few doctors were willing 
to make purchases (outcome). Managers saw 
that many German doctors waited to follow 
the actions of the regions most prominent 
doctors (change in cognition).
T
T: After entering Japan, leaders 
discovered that doctors just wanted 
printouts, not the machine (outcome).  
The learned their product was too big 
(change in cognition).
T: Leaders used local distributor to 
promote technology (action), but few 
doctors responded positively 
(outcome). After talking with a few 
doctors, leaders realized that many 
doctors felt distributors were corrupt 
and so did not like to work with them 
(change in cognition).  Leaders began 
to look for a consulting company that 
could perform the same role (change in 
behavior).
Adams ET
E: Australia was seen as a test bed 
where leaders could learn to do 
international business. Leaders gave 
manager lots of autonomy (action) but 
found that this resulted in a disconnect 
from corporate (outcome) so leaders 
added oversight (change in behavior).
T:  Corporate leaders pushed local 
country manager to use a features and 
functions selling approach (action). 
After little success (outcome) the 
country manager persuaded corporate to 
adopt a more solutions/consultative 
selling approach (change in behavior). 
ET
E: Entered U.K. with a very small team to 
gauge market interest. Leaders saw interest 
and so entered.
T: Local country manager worked to leverage 
existing relationships from the U.S. to U.K. 
(action) but realized that relationships didnt 
translate to Europe (outcome).This caused 
leaders to see they needed a good 
implementation partner to build value 
proposition.  They thus hired PWC (change 
in cognition and then behavior).
ET
E: Entered France to see if European 
expansion was possible. Leaders realized 
they were early to the market (outcome).  
As a result, corporate decided to slow entry 
into France (change in behavior). 
T:  Leaders signed a customer in France on 
the basis that they would be putting a team 
of French nationals in place in fairly short 
order (action). However, the American 
economy and the business was starting to 
slow down globally and so there was not 
enough resources to expand (outcome). 
Thus, corporate decided to concentrate on 
larger markets (change in behavior).
T
T: Leaders entered country after 
German customer expressed interest 
(action). They found it hard to close 
deals given lack of resources from the 
U.S. corporate office (outcome) and so 
decided to pull out of the country  and 
focus on building up major markets in 
the U.K. and U.S. (change in 
behavior).
Stahlberg IT
I: Leaders entered Sweden to do 
business with a big customer but during
contract negotiation the customer 
wanted more than initially agreed and so 
the country manager had to improvise a 
novel discount policy. Leaders learned 
that big reference accounts required 
larger discounts than expected.
T: After signing, the customer
complained about local support. Dealing 
with the challenge helped leaders see 
they needed more of an infrastructure in 
Sweden (change in behavior).
IT
I:  When country manager found out that 
German customer wanted more than a license 
deal, he created a novel solution sale as well.
Firm learned another way to promote its 
products. 
T: Leaders found that running the operation 
from Finland proved difficult to close 
subsequent deals (outcome). Leaders realized 
that they should have conducted more up 
front research and had greater local country 
contacts and so decided to hire a local 
country manager (change in cognition and 
behavior).
T
T: Leaders entered the U.S. and moved
many functions to the U.S. such as 
marketing and sales since the market was 
perceived to be so big (action). However, 
leaders found that moving too many 
functions too soon made the firm too US 
focused (outcome).  HQ management 
decided to move some functions back to 
Finland where it could have greater control 
(change in behavior).
T
T: Leaders began with a commission-
based P&L (action). But, the 
commission-based system did not 
work well (outcome) and so leader 
switched to transfer pricing (change in 
behavior).
Polk ET
E: Experimented after entering China by 
sending a trial version of the software 
aggressively everywhere to see which 
companies would be most interested. 
Discovered that systems integrators 
appeared particularly attractive.
T: Used a sales approach with potential 
customers that relied on using US 
references (action). China firms did not 
readily accept those references 
(outcome). Leaders came to understand 
that China-based references were more 
important (change in cognition). 
IT
I: When trying to create unique product 
solution for Compaq in Germany, engineers 
uncovered a valuable product feature the 
management didnt know existed (change 
protocol based on location). This feature was 
then promoted as a key feature (new activity).  
T: When completing the project for Compaq 
(action) there sometimes arose project 
management difficulties associated with 
cultural differences (outcome). HQ realized 
that the firm should have put people on the 
ground in the country with knowledge of the 
culture and language (change in cognition)
IT
I: Had to adjust in real-time several features 
of its proof of concept for first customer.
T:  While trying to complete customer 
solution in Switzerland the firm relied on a 
fly in model and sent people over to 
Switzerland for periods of time to work 
with customer (action). Leaders at HQ 
began to see that this model of doing sales 
and support from US was very inefficient 
(outcome). They decided that countries 
entered should have a local office and 
country manager and so they hired a local 
person (change in behavior)
T
T: Hired local sales manager and 
established an office in the U.K. to 
generate local sales (action).  However, 
sales were much slower than expected 
(outcome).  HQ leaders realized that 
their marketing message was too 
technical and not enough around a 
business solution. As a result they 
altered their sales approach to make it 
more understandable (change in 
behavior)
Nair ETE
E: India seen as test bed to develop 
new solutions as development costs 
were much lower cost than in other 
countries
T: Worked hard to close deals (action) 
but had few sales (outcome). Leaders 
realized that local firms wanted Indian 
pricing and so leaders had to give 
bigger discounts (change in action).
E: Experimented promoting different 
products (i.e., trial solutions, educational 
products, high throughput screening) to 
see which would be in most demand. 
High throughput screening seemed best 
and so was emphasized.
ET EA
E: Threw out seeds to see which (country) 
would germinate fastest. Japanese seemed 
interested so entered country with a partner
T: Leaders created a contract with a firm 
(action) but drastically overpriced solution
(outcome) and so learned to not overprice
(change in action).
E: Experimented selling both an integrated 
solution as well as component parts of 
solutions. Japanese liked the component parts 
more and so leaders began to offer more 
modular solutions (change in behavior).
A: Learned from partner how better negotiate 
with clients - what are the things they fight 
for and what are the things they leave alone.
TA
I: Leaders entered Australia and began 
working with IBM to showcase solutions at 
conferences and workshops (action). After 
little success (outcome) leaders realized that 
too much educating was wasting time and 
should be significantly cut back (change in 
behavior).
A: Leaders learned from Australian 
academics information on market 
opportunities in Australia; specifically 
which projects the government was 
funding. This impacted how the firm 
positioned its products (change in 
behavior).
TA
T: After entering Malaysia, firm tried 
to promote its bioinformatics solutions 
to several promising customers 
(action) but firms in the Malaysian 
market were not that familiar with 
bioinformatics and so were reluctant to 
purchase solutions (outcome). This 
caused leaders to spend more time in 
doing roadshows to help educate 
others (change behavior). 
A: Lack of sales pushed leaders to rely 
more on local partner to do 
relationship management so firm 
could gain access to top accounts 
(change in action).
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